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AS A MATTER OF LAW, DEFENDANT COLLECTED AND THEREBY 
TERMINATED PLAINTIFF'S PIP PAYMENT RIGHTS AND CHARGED A FEE 
THEREON IN VIOLATION OF LAW AND HIS AGREEMENT WITH HIS CLIENT 
Defendant repeatedly asserts in his brief that "there was no 
settlement with the PIP carrier." (For example, see Defendant's 
Brief, page 2 of Point II; Defendant wrongfully failed to number 
the pages of his brief.) As a matter of law, these assertions are 
not correct. First, it is uncontroverted that the Plaintiff's PIP 
carrier was Allstate. (Defendant's Brief, Statement of Fact 4.) 
It is also uncontested that Allstate was the liability carrier for 
the adverse driver and that it was Allstate with which the 
Defendant negotiated and obtained a settlement that included all 
unpaid medical bills. (See Defendant's Brief, Statement of Fact 
13.) 
As a matter of lawf because the settlement included the 
medical benefits to which the Plaintiff was entitled, her rights to 
the PIP benefits were extinguished. In Jones v. Transamerica 
Insurance Co., 592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979), the plaintiff claimed 
injuries from an automobile accident. He asserted various claims 
to his own PIP carrier and it refused to pay them. Thereafter, he 
entered into a settlement agreement and signed a complete release 
with the tortfeasor's insurance carrier. He then sued his own 
insurance carrier for PIP benefits. In upholding summary judgment 
for the insurer, this Court stated: 
1 
An injured person will not be permitted to 
recover from an insurance carrier (over and 
above what the carrier has previously paid in 
benefits) once he has successfully recovered 
from his tortfeasor for personal injuries. 
Any other interpretation would be to permit 
double recovery. 
. • • • 
Double recovery for a single item of loss was 
never contemplated by the legislature and we 
will not permit any type of automatic reward 
or "windfall" to an injured plaintiff. 
Plaintiff accepted the $6,000 from his 
tortfeasors as additional recovery in lieu of 
any further insurance benefits to which he 
might have been entitled. 
The rights to which the subrogee succeeds can 
be no greater than those of the person for 
whom he is substituted. By executing the 
release, plaintiff discharged the tortfeasors 
of any and all liability, notwithstanding the 
attempted "specific exclusion" relating to no-
fault benefits. By so doing, plaintiff has 
chosen his recovery and cannot now 
successfully assert a claim against his 
insurer. 
Id. at 611-12. As a matter of law, when Mr. Hughes settled 
Archuleta's tort claim to include the unpaid medical expenses of 
$2,400, he cut off all of her rights to any further PIP benefits. 
The outstanding claims for PIP benefits are included as a matter of 
law in the recovery from the tortfeasor. Hence, the right to PIP 
benefits is cut off to prevent a double recovery. 
Mr. Hughes' suggestion to this Court that he never collected 
PIP benefits demonstrates an ignorance of Utah tort law and 
specifically of the principles set forth in Jones, supra. 
Not only did Mr. Hughes collect the unpaid PIP medical 
expenses as a matter of law, but the particular facts of this case 
make it clear that the PIP payments were intentionally collected 
factually. The uncontroverted facts establish that Ron Bennett 
accepted the insurance company's offer of $6,500 with a proviso 
that the unpaid medical expenses of $2,786 be included in the 
settlement rather than being submitted for payment under the 
Plaintiff's PIP policy and then reimbursed by the liability 
carrier. 
Because medical expenses of $600 had been submitted to the PIP 
carrier and had been paid, only $2,400 of this $2,786 would have 
been paid by the PIP carrier if those expenses had been submitted. 
(R. at 694 and R. at 1063-64.) Archuleta was never told that the 
settlement included unpaid PIP benefits. (R. at 693, 1ffl 9-11; 694, 
HH 12, 13; 697, H 44; 698, H1f 46-51.) Of course, the jury was 
never told that Donald Hughes would be responsible for the acts of 
his agent, Ronald Bennett, and perhaps that explains the jury's 
verdict. 
Furthermore, it is also clear that under Hughes' contingent 
fee agreement he was not entitled to collect $800 as the one-third 
attorney fee charged on the $2,400 of unpaid medical expenses that 
would have been paid by PIP. The interpretation of a written 
attorney fee agreement presents a question of law to be decided by 
the court and not by the jury. Phillips v. Smith, 768 P.2d 449 
(Utah 1989). Because the interpretation of this written attorney 
fee agreement was a question of law, no contract issues were tried 
3 
to the jury. Neither Utah law nor the written contract between the 
parties provided for a contingent fee for the collection of PIP 
benefits, (See pp. 9-16 of Appendix B, R. at 700-707.) 
Despite the conclusory denial by Hughes in his brief in 
opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgmentf 
there were no genuine issues of fact raised in opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment that were material 
to this contract issue. The following four undisputed facts are 
determinative: 
1. The $9,286 gross settlement of the PI case included 
$2f400 of unpaid medical expenses related to the injuries sustained 
in the wreck. (R. at 693) (Uncontroverted Fact #10 which was based 
on Hughes' own admissions at deposition and which Hughes did not 
dispute in his response to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment). 
2. Hughes took a full one-third attorney fee of $800 on the 
$2f400 of unpaid medical expenses that were included in the 
settlement. (R. at 693) (Uncontroverted Fact #11 which was based 
on Hughes' answers to interrogatories and his own deposition 
testimony and which Hughes did not dispute in his response to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment). 
3. The $2,400 of unpaid medical expenses were never 
submitted for payment under the PIP portion of Archuleta's own 
insurance policy. (R. at 694) (Uncontroverted Fact #12 which was 
admitted by Hughes at deposition and which Hughes did not dispute 
4 
in his response to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment)• 
4. The $2,400 of unpaid medical expenses would have been 
paid by Archuleta's PIP insurance if the bills had been submitted 
to them for payment. (R. at 694) (Uncontroverted Fact #13 which is 
based on Hughes' admissions at deposition and the deposition 
testimony of the PIP adjuster and which Hughes did not dispute in 
his response to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment). 
These four undisputed facts clearly establish that Plaintiff 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law for a full refund of 
this $800 attorney fee which was wrongfully collected. 
Not only did Hughes fail to refute the four necessary elements 
above establishing partial summary judgment on this point, but the 
affidavit he did submit was substantively defective. 
As pointed out by Plaintiff at R-440 and in her Motion to 
Strike Portions of Defendant's Affidavit (R. at 449), many portions 
of the affidavit submitted by Hughes in support of his Memorandum 
in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment were not 
based on personal knowledge as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). 
(Nor did Hughes affirmatively claim to have personal knowledge of 
the "facts" asserted in the affidavit as required by Utah R. Civ. 
P. 56(e).) (GNS Partnership v. Fullmer, 873 P.2d 1157 (Utah App. 
1994).) Thus, Plaintiff's Motion to Strike portions of Defendant's 
affidavit (R. at 449) should have been granted. Howick v. Bank of 
Salt Lake, 28 Utah 2d 64, 65f 498 P.2d 352f 353-54 (1972). Because 
inadmissible evidence cannot be considered in ruling on a motion 
5 
for summary judgment, D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420, 421 
(Utah 1989), any portion of Defendant's Affidavit that was not 
based on personal knowledge could not be considered by the Court in 
ruling on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. But, more 
importantly, even if these defects are overlooked, the plain fact 
remains that Hughes did not dispute the four simple elements that 
establish that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
for refund of the $800 attorney fee charged for collecting the 
$2,400 of medical bills that should have been paid under the PIP 
portion with Archuleta's own policy. 
Hughes claimed that even if the bills had been paid by PIP, he 
still would have been entitled to a one-third fee because of his 
attorney retainer agreement. (R. at 1098, lines 24 & 25; R. at 
1100.) He was wrong about this because contingent fees on PIP 
benefits are simply not permitted under Utah law for the reasons 
set forth at pages 11-16 of Appendix B (R. at 702-707). See also 
Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion #114, Trial Exhibit #14, R. 
at 586). 
Defendant's new claim that no fee was taken on PIP benefits is 
simply without merit. The uncontroverted fact established by the 
depositions of both adjusters present at the settlement conference 
was that the insurance company offered $6,500 to settle the case 
and that offer was accepted by Bennett, acting as agent for Hughes. 
It was then agreed that the $2,786 in unpaid medical expenses would 
be added to the settlement rather than submitted to the PIP carrier 
($2,400 of which would have been paid under PIP). (R. at 693) 
6 
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testimony of Hughes, R. at 1084). More importantly, the moving 
papers supporting the motion for summary judgment established that 
Hughes himself admitted in his deposition that the $2,400 of unpaid 
medical expenses would have been paid by Archuleta's PIP insurance 
if the bills had been submitted for payment. (R. at 694.) These 
acknowledgements were not only based upon the admissions of 
Mr. Hughes in his deposition but also based upon the deposition of 
the Allstate PIP adjuster, Sandra Mcintosh. 
2. In support of his position that he did not take a PIP 
fee, Mr. Hughes points to the fact that he did not take a fee on 
the $618 paid by the PIP carrier when Maxcine Archuleta submitted 
her bills directly to them. Mr. Hughes specifically cites 
paragraph 4 of his affidavit which applies only to the 
approximately $600 of expenses that were submitted to the PIP 
carrier by Archuleta, and which was paid in full by the PIP 
carrier. The fact that he did not take a fee on the first $618 
cannot possibly be construed as a denial that he took a fee of $800 
on the remaining $2,4 00 of unpaid medical expenses that would have 
been paid by the PIP carrier if submitted to them. (R. at 694.) 
3. Mr. Hughes claims that at trial Maxcine Archuleta was not 
able to identify and refer to her medical bills to establish 
$3,000. He then suggests that she did not have $3,000 in medical 
bills. This is denied by the fact that the moving papers in 
support of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment establish that 
there was $3,000 of medical bills from the accident. This claim is 
8 
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Archuleta testified at ti.ial: . ' . 
Qi What did you do with this bi 11? 
A: This is one of the ones I gave Ron. 
Q: All right. You didn't take this up to 
Allstate? 
A: i Jo, 
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Q: Why did you take it to him instead of 
taking it to Allstate? 
A: Because he told me he would handle it 
from here on. 
(R. at 981.) It is significant that the record discloses on the 
very next two pages a discussion with the court about the party 
admission exception to the hearsay rule and the court states in 
front of the jury: "I don't have any evidence in front of me of an 
agency relationship. I'm very familiar with the hearsay rule but 
anyway you go ahead." (R. at 983.) 
As indicated in the briefs, Ron Bennett did not testify at 
trial. Hence, it is uncontested that Ron Bennett told 
Ms. Archuleta to bring the medical bills to him and he would take 
care of them rather than submit them to the insurer. It was the 
same Ron Bennett, while acting for Mr. Hughes, who specifically 
asked Allstate to include the medical bills in the settlement 
rather than pay them under PIP so that Ron Bennett and Mr. Hughes 
could take a fee on those amounts. Unfortunately, as indicated 
hereafter, the jury was never told that Mr. Hughes must be 
responsible for the actions of his agent, Ron Bennett. 
6. Finally, Mr. Hughes suggests that the bills were not paid 
by PIP so that Maxcine Archuleta could submit them to her health 
insurance carrier. There is not a shred of evidence in Mr. Hughes' 
affidavit or documents opposing the Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment that even remotely hints to this. Furthermore, the 
uncontested testimony of Maxcine Archuleta establishes that the 
health insurance carrier refused to pay bills that should have been 
paid by the PIP carrier: 
10 
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Hughes the right to take a contingent fee on PIP benefits and 
entitlements. 
POINT II 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, ARCHULETA WAS ENTITLED TO A REFUND 
OF THE $3f095 ATTORNEY FEE BECAUSE THE CONTRACT 
DID NOT PROVIDE FOR A FEE FOR THE SPECIFIC WORK DONE 
OR THE RESULT OBTAINED IN THIS CASE 
The interpretation of a written attorney fee agreement 
presents a question of law, Phillips v. Smith, 768 P.2d 449 (Utah 
1989), Furthermore, a court will strictly construe the terms in 
the contract against one who is both the attorney draftsman of and 
a party to the instrument. Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee# 
6 Utah 2d 98, 102, 306 P.2d 773, 775 (1957). For these reasons, 
the purported "facts" set forth by the Defendant in his brief are 
not relevant. Likewise, these were not issues for the jury and 
were not and could not have been tried to the jury. Since they are 
issues of law, this Court will review the issues for correctness 
and should not give any deference to a jury verdict or a ruling of 
the court below. 
It was undisputed that Hughes collected $3,095 as a full one-
third of the $9,286 settlement. As pointed out by the Plaintiff at 
R-444, R-699, R-707 and R-738-39, the written attorney retainer 
agreement prepared by Hughes and signed by Archuleta clearly 
provides for a contingent fee payable to Hughes only when 
settlement or judgment is "obtained after trial or within 10 days 
of the date set for trial." Clearly, that was a contingency that 
did not occur in this case since there was no trial nor a date set 
for the trial of Archuleta's underlying case. Thus, under the 
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coun. has no di so ret ion to defer r ul i ng on a properly presented 
motion for summary judgment nor to defer the Issues to a jury If 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56.) Furthermore, the Court not the jury must decide 
issues of law. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO THE REQUESTED "AGENCY" 
JURY INSTRUCTION 
A. THE REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION IS IDENTIFIED IN THE 
RECORD. 
In his brief, Hughes complains that the agency instruction 
requested by Plaintiff was not identified. That argument is 
without merit. The agency instruction requested by Plaintiff was 
MUJI 25.2. A copy is found at R-497 of the record. Arguments of 
Plaintiff's counsel that include specific references to this MUJI 
instruction are found at R-1052 of the record.1 
B. NUMEROUS AGENCY ISSUES WERE RAISED AT TRIAL. 
Agency issues were raised throughout the trial. For example, 
at R-969-70 (a copy of transcript attached at Appendix H) , 
Plaintiff attempted to introduce evidence of Bennett's involvement 
in soliciting Archuleta on behalf of Hughes. Hughes objected to 
the questioning and the Court granted the objection. Plaintiff's 
counsel attempted to argue the point but was cut off by the Court 
with the following statement: 
But that's Mr. Bennett. Mr. Bennett is not on 
trial here. I've granted the objection. Move 
on to your next question, please, 
(R. at 970, lines 1-3.) 
lrThe reporter who transcribed that hearing misspelled "MUJI" 
as "MOOCHIE" and also transcribed "agency" as "agent fee." 
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Note that the Court's pronouncement was made i n the jury's 
presence. 
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at lines 13 & 14 says he was not. Hughes never accepted 
responsibility for Bennett's acts. Hughes opposed Plaintiff's 
requested agency jury instruction and the Court refused to give it. 
At page 20 of his brieff Hughes states: "Neither party called 
Bennett as a witness. Perhaps that is because neither party 
thought he had much to add . . . ." That statement lacks candor. 
The true reason Bennett was not called at trial was because his 
whereabouts were unknown. (See R. at 459 for Plaintiff's Motion to 
Preclude the Testimony of Ronald S. Bennett on the grounds that 
Defendant claimed not to know where to find him or refused to 
disclose the information; see also R. at 928, lines 20-25, and 
R. at 929 where Hughes tells the Court he spoke to Bennett six 
weeks earlier but did not at the time of trial know where he was 
nor how to contact him.) 
C, ARCHULETA PROVIDED A PROPER CITATION TO THE JUDGE'S QUOTE 
THAT "BENNETT IS NOT ON TRIAL HERE." 
Hughes denies that the Judge commented that "Bennett is not on 
trial here" and complains that no citation or reference to the 
record was included in Plaintiff's brief. Hughes is in error on 
both points. The citation is found at page 9, paragraph 3 of 
Plaintiff's main brief. The citation is to R-970 which is correct. 
A copy of the transcript showing the Court's statement that 
"Bennett is not on trial here" is attached at Appendix H. 
This comment by the Court was highly prejudicial and made the 
need for an agency instruction even greater. How could the jury be 
expected to hold Hughes accountable for malpractice that included 
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numerous acts and omissions by Bennett without a clear instruction 
that Hughes was responsible for Bennett's acts. It certainly 
cannot be said that this error was harmless in the face of the 
court granting Hughes' objection to testimony about Bennett's acts 
with the statement that "Bennett [was] not on trial." The court 
was telling the jury to disregard Bennett's actions entirely. 
POINT V 
PLAINTIFF WAS CLEARLY ENTITLED TO OBTAIN COPIES 
OF THE CREDIT UNION STATEMENTS SOUGHT IN DISCOVERY 
The Court clearly should have granted Plaintiff's Motion to 
Compel Discovery of credit union statements that would establish 
the amount of interest earned by Hughes on Archuleta's money. 
Defendant refused to produce the bank statements on the grounds 
that the information would identify other legal clients of his and 
thereby violate their confidentiality. That claim is clearly 
erroneous on its face. Credit Union statements simply do not 
contain or reflect client names nor any other identifying 
information. They show only dates, amounts and check numbers. 
Hughes has no right to conceal this information from Archuleta 
since it was her money that he had kept in this account. 
In his opposing brief at the third to the last (unnumbered) 
pagef Defendant claims that "her [Plaintiff's] attorney refused the 
suggestion the Court examine the bank records to assure that the 
funds were there. Plaintiff's counsel would only be satisfied with 
his auditing the bank records and having them in his possession." 
That is a blatant misrepresentation. No reference to the record is 
provided because it simply did not happen. Instead, the very 
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opposite is true. The transcript of a telephone hearing on 
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery held on the 29th of 
November, 1995, is found at R-906-18. During that hearing, 
Plaintiff's attorney agreed that any confidential material that 
might be reflected on the statements being sought should be 
redacted. 
[PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL] 
Now, I would agree that if there is 
confidential information on that, if there is 
confidential information, it should be 
redacted, it should be blacked out. If 
there's a client name, if there's a client 
address, that should be blacked out . . . . 
(R. at 915, lines 18-23.) 
Of course no such confidential information would be found on 
those documents, but if there were, it would be easy to protect 
that information and still give Plaintiff the documents to which 
she was entitled. 
In his brief, Hughes seems to be changing course and switching 
his argument from that of protecting client confidentiality to that 
of protecting certain information from possible use in another 
case. That argument was not raised below. If that had been a 
legitimate concern, the proper course of action would have been a 
motion for protective order limiting the use of the information to 
the case at hand. It certainly would not be proper to deprive 
Archuleta of discovery and access to information that could lead to 
admissible evidence simply to protect Defendant from the possible 
use of the information in another case, particularly when 
Defendant's concerns are not clearly expressed. 
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A. THE COURT SHOULD TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO PROVIDE 
GUIDANCE ON THE PROPER WAY TO RESPOND TO A MOTION TO COMPEL 
DISCOVERY OF DOCUMENTS WHEN A CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE IS MADE. 
Duplicate credit union or bank statements are inexpensive and 
easy to obtain. In this case, Hughes should have been required to 
produce copies of the credit union statements for "in camera" 
inspection by the Court so that the Court could properly determine 
whether or not there was a legitimate claim of privilege. See 
United Mercantile Agencies v. Silver Fleet Motor Express, Inc., 1 
F.R.D. 709 (W.D. Ky. 1941); Collins & Aikman Corp. v. J.P. Stevens 
& Co., 51 F.R.D. 219f 169 U.S.P.Q. 296 (D.C.S.C. 1971). If client 
names or addresses or other identifying information were present in 
the statements, they could have been redacted on the copy provided 
to Plaintiff but not on the copy provided to the trial court so 
that the court would have been able to verify that the redacted 
material was truly privileged. 
The Appellate Court should take this opportunity to provide 
guidance on the proper way to respond to a motion to compel 
discovery of documents when a claim of privilege is made. When it 
is not unduly burdensome or inconvenient to do so, copies of the 
documents should be produced with the portion for which a 
"privilege" is claimed being "blacked out" or otherwise removed 
from what is provided to the requesting party. At the same time, 
an unredacted copy should be provided to the Court for "in camera" 
inspection. This would allow the court to verify that the removed 
material was indeed privileged. Otherwise, it is impossible for 
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the requesting party to verify that information or documents being 
withheld are subject to a valid claim of privilege. In certain 
cases the court may also consider appointing a discovery master for 
the purpose of confirming that only truly privileged material is 
being withheld. 
POINT VI 
THE UNDISPUTED FACTS ESTABLISH THAT DEFENDANT 
WAS GUILTY OF CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD 
When Mr. Bennett, while acting for Mr. Hughes, directed 
Allstate to include the PIP amount into the final settlement so 
that an attorney's contingent fee could be taken on those sums, he 
performed an action that worked to the benefit of Mr. Hughes and to 
the detriment of Mr. Hughes' client, Maxcine Archuleta. 
Unfortunately, we will never know how often this sad event occurs 
and is never caught or complained of. In its ethics opinion #114, 
the Utah State Bar has recognized this scenario as a continuing 
problem (R. at 586-91). To this date, Mr. Hughes sees nothing 
wrong with this type of activity. Perhaps that is because he has 
done the same thing many times in the past. Perhaps it is still 
being done. This case presents a classic opportunity for this 
Court to place some teeth into the ethics opinion against 
collecting contingent fees on PIP amounts. The legal mechanism of 
constructive fraud is already in place and must be applied to the 
facts presented here. 
In circumstances where a defendant exercises extraordinary 
influence over the plaintiff and should be aware of the trust and 
confidence placed by the plaintiff on the defendant, the defendant 
20 
is said to be in a "confidential relationship." Blodgett v. 
Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978). In these circumstances, the law 
recognizes constructive fraud, and if there is found to be the 
"slightest crace of undue influence or unfair advantage, redress 
will be given to the injured party." Id. at 302. The law presumes 
an attorney-client relationship to be just such a confidential 
relationship. Id. at 302. 
To establish constructive fraud, it is not necessary to 
establish an actual intent to defraud. Rather, it results from a 
breach of the obligation implicit in the relationship. Von Hake v. 
Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985); Harrell v. Branson, 344 So. 2d 
604 (Fla. App. 1977). If a confidential relationship exists, any 
transaction that benefits the party in whom trust is reposed is 
presumed to have been unfair and to have resulted from undue 
influence and fraud. Furthermore, the benefitting party bears the 
burden of proving that the transaction is fair. Von Hake, supra. 
It has been explained by the Utah State Bar's Ethics Advisory 
Opinion Committee that the client must be "[fjully informed as to 
the degree of risk justifying a contingent fee." Opinion 114 (R. 
at 586). The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals explained 
further that the requirement that a client be fully informed 
especially applies to a contingent-fee contract. 
The client needs to be fully informed as to 
the degree of risk justifying a contingent fee 
. . . . The clearest case where there would 
be an absence of real risk would be a case in 
which an attorney attempts to collect from a 
client a supposedly contingent fee for 
obtaining insurance proceeds for a client when 
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there is no indication that the insurer will 
resist the claim. 
Committee on Legal Ethics v. Tatterson, 352 S.E.2d 107f 114-15 
(W.V. Sup. Ct. App. 1986). 
Here, Mr. Hughes has never come forward with any evidence to 
establish that he explained to his client, Maxcine Archuleta, that 
he was taking a fee on PIP claims which had no risk by his own 
admission and testimony. Instead, without any disclosure he 
benefitted himself to the detriment of his client and by doing so 
violated an ethics opinion and the case law cited above. This is 
the classic case crying out for constructive fraud. 
All three elements of constructive fraud are met: 
1. A confidential relationship existed. (Von Hake, supra; 
Blodgett, supra; and In re Swan's Estate, 4 Utah 2d 277, 281, 283 
P.2d 682, 684 (1956). 
2. A transaction that benefitted the superior party in a 
confidential relationship. 
3. Actual damages. 
Clearly, Plaintiff should have been granted partial summary 
judgment on the issue of constructive fraud. The only remaining 
issue should have been the amount of punitive damages to be 
awarded. 
CONCLUSION 
This appeal presents only questions of law. Even if she were 
not entitled to a refund of the entire fee, Plaintiff is entitled 
to $800 as a refund of the one-third fee charged on the $2,400 of 
unpaid medical expenses that would have been paid by her own PIP 
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carrier if they had simply been submitted to it. The four facts 
material to this issue are simple and were undisputed by the 
parties at the summary judgment level. The timing of the hearing 
on the motion was of no significance and the Court did not have 
discretion to defer to a jury rather than grant a Rule 56 motion 
since the Plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Furthermore, the written contract simply did not provide for 
a fee for a case that settled more than ten days before trial. 
There is really no ambiguity in the contact language that controls 
the outcome of this issue. But even if the language is deemed to 
be ambiguous, that ambiguity must be resolved against the attorney 
draftsman and not in his favor. The result is not as draconian as 
it appears, however, since the Defendant may still be entitled to 
a fee based on a theory of quantum meruit. 
Plaintiff was entitled to her proposed agency jury 
instruction. The Court's error in refusing the instruction was 
particularly prejudicial in light of the Court's sustaining an 
objection to a question about Bennett's actions by stating in the 
jury's presence that "Bennett is not on trial here." 
Plaintiff was clearly entitled to copies of the credit union 
statements for the period during which her money was on deposit so 
that she could determine for herself how much interest Hughes had 
earned thereon. Defendant's claim of privilege is simply not 
supportable. Any legitimate claim of privilege could have been 
easily avoided by redacting any privileged information on the copy 
of the statement provided to Plaintiff. 
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Finally, all the elements of constructive fraud were 
established by undisputed facts presented in a properly supported 
motion for summary judgment which should have been granted. 
'%t*&. c 
Date 
QL <7T /<7<76 *>J I \ x. $k<. tf.vsy, Richard Glauser 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed 2 copies of the foregoing brief, 
postage pre-paid to: 
Donald C. Hughes 
P.O. Box 572112 
Houston, TX 77257 
frdtJ^ tt«A • /C19& 
Date ^gnature 
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Daniel L. Wilson, #4257 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
290-25th Street, Suite 204 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-6119 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MAXCINE ARCHULETA, : PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGEMENT 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
DONALD C. HUGHES : Civil No.940700264 
Defendant. : Judge Dawson 
Plaintiff hereby moves for partial Summary Judgement against 
defendant on portions of all three of her claims. 
1. Plaintiff is entitled to Summary Judgement against 
defendant for $800 as the amount of attorney fees charged on $2,4 00 
of unpaid medical expenses that were included in the liability 
settlement of a personal injury case but which should have been 
submitted for payment under the PIP portion of plaintiff's own 
policy. Summary Judgement is mandated because neither Utah law nor 
the contract provide for contingent fees for the collection of PIP 
benefits. 
2. Plaintiff is entitled to Summary Judgement against 
defendant for fraud. The uncontested facts of this case establish 
constructive fraud as a matter of law. Because of the fraud, 
plaintiff is entitled to Summary Judgement against defendant for 
the balance of her attorney fees paid. She is further entitled to 
punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial. Plaintiff 
l\-\ 
is entitled to a refund of all attorney fees paid because the 
contract itself does not provide for a fee for the work done in 
this case nor for the result obtained. 
3. Finally, plaintiff is entitled to Summary Judgement on 
the issue of legal malpractice. The uncontested facts of this case 
show that, as a matter of law, defendant's legal representation 
fell far short of the required standard of care for lawyers 
representing clients in personal injury actions. Plaintiff's 
damages for this malpractice is the difference between what her 
case should have been worth and the $5,000 that she actually 
received. A trial will be required on the issue of those damages. 
Pursuant to the Code of Judicial Administration, a Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Partial Motion 
for Summary Judgement accompanies this Motion. 
Date Daniel L. Wilson 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Mailed To: Donald C. Hughes 
P.O. Box 27611 
St. Louis, MO 63146 
Date Signature 
A-a-
Daniel L. Wilson, #4257 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
290-25th Street, Suite 204 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-6119 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




DONALD C. HUGHES 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 




Plaintiff submits the following Memorandum in Support of her 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgement. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. This is a fraud, legal malpractice and breach of contract 
case (Complaint) . 
2. Defendant (Hughes), a lawyer, represented plaintiff 
(Archuleta) in a personal injury (PI) case. (Hughes' deposition, 
page 23, lines 17-19.) 
3. Less than a week after having been injured in an auto 
accident, Archuleta was contacted by Ronald Bennett, a non-lawyer 
who offered to represent her. (Archuleta's deposition, page 65, 
line 23.) 
4. In response to the solicitation, Archuleta visited 
Bennett and signed an Attorney Retainer Agreement (the contract) 
retaining Donald Hughes, the defendant herein, as her attorney. 
(Archuleta's deposition page 59.) 
(3- \ 
5. The Attorney Retainer Agreement (the contract) was in 
writing and is attached at EXHIBIT 1. (Hughes' Answers to 
Interrogatories and Request for Production of documents.) (Hughes' 
deposition, page 38, lines 5-12.) 
6. The tortfeasor in the underlying PI case was insured by 
Allstate insurance company. (Hughes' deposition, page 64, lines 
18-20.) 
7. In addition to insuring the tortfeasor, Allstate 
Insurance Company also insured Archuleta's vehicle. (Hughes' 
deposition, page 108, line 5.) 
8 Archuleta's insurance with Allstate included Personal 
Injury Protection (PIP) coverage. (Hughes' deposition, page 61, 
line 21.) 
9. Archuleta's PI case settled for a total of $9,286.00. 
(Hughes' Answers to Interrogatories and Request for Production of 
Documents.) 
10. The $9,286.00 gross settlement of the PI case included 
$2,400 for unpaid medical expenses related to injuries sustained in 
the wreck. (Hughes' deposition, page 63, lines 16-22 and page 152, 
lines 12-25.) 
11. Hughes took a full one-third attorney fee of $800 on the 
$2,400 of unpaid medical expenses that were included in the 
settlement. (Defendant's answers to Interrogatories and Request 
for Production of Documents.) (Hughes' deposition page 55, lines 
12-25.) 
£ - 2 -
12. The $2,400 of unpaid medical expenses were never 
submitted to Allstate Insurance Company for payment under the PIP 
portion of Archuleta's policy. (Hughes' deposition page 63, lines 
23-25.) 
13. Hughes admits the $2,400 of unpaid medical expenses would 
have been paid by Archuleta's PIP insurance if the bills had been 
submitted for payment. (Hughes' deposition, page 63, lines 23-25 
and page 64, lines 1 and 2.) (See also deposition of the Allstate 
PIP adjustor, Sandra Mcintosh, page 35.) 
14. Hughes admits he was not present when Archuleta signed 
the attorney retainer agreement. (Hughes' deposition, page 3 8.) 
15. In fact, Hughes admits he never personally met Archuleta, 
his client. (Hughes' deposition, page 3 8.) 
16. Hughes admits he had a non-lawyer [Bennett] obtain the 
clients signature on his attorney retainer agreement and on the 
medical release form. (Hughes' deposition, page 40, lines 21-24.) 
17. Hughes further admits that neither he nor the client 
filled in the blank spaces of his attorney retainer agreement and 
instead that Bennett probably did so. (Hughes' deposition, page 
40, lines 9-12.) 
18. Hughes admits he did not have sufficient control over 
Bennett to create an employer/employee relationship. (Hughes' 
deposition page 36, lines 13-16.) 
19. Hughes only recalls talking to Archuleta twice and both 
conversations were by phone. (Hughes' deposition page 46, lines 
19-25.) [NOTE- Archuleta says they had only one conversation and 
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that occurred by phone after Bennett had agreed to a settlement.] 
20. Archuleta's phone number was not even in Hughes' legal 
file- (Hughes' deposition, page 51, lines 18-21.) 
21. Hughes never sent any type of correspondence to his 
client, Archuleta. (Hughes' deposition page 149, lines 16-18.) 
22. Hughes never telephoned his client. (Hughes' deposition, 
page 15 0, lines 2-5.) 
23. Hughes told his client he would investigate the case. 
(Hughes' deposition, page 41, lines 9-11.) 
24. Hughes never spoke to the driver who caused the wreck. 
(Hughes' deposition, page 85, line 10.) 
25. Hughes never spoke to the police officer who investigated 
the collision. (Hughes' deposition page 85, line 8.) 
26. Hughes never spoke to the person who witnessed the 
collision. (Hughes' deposition page 85, lines 1.) 
27. Hughes admits he never spoke to any insurance adjustor 
about liability. (Hughes' deposition, page 7, line 6.) 
28. Hughes doesn't specifically remember talking to any 
insurance adjustor about anything until after the case was settled. 
(Hughes' deposition, page 89, lines 1-2 0.) 
29. All three adjustors who worked on the file state 
categorically that they never spoke to Hughes nor even knew he was 
involved in the case until after it was settled. (See deposition 
of Mcintosh, Ulrich and Palmer.) 
30. Hughes didn't file suit and didn't do any discovery. 
(Hughes' deposition, page 128.) 
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31. Hughes didn't obtain repair records and didn't know how 
much damage had been done to his client's car. (Hughes' 
deposition, page 72.) 
32. Hughes did not request that his client be evaluated by an 
orthopedic specialist even though she had an orthopedic injury. 
(Hughes' deposition, page 98 and 99.) 
33. Hughes never spoke to his client's doctor. (Hughes' 
deposition, page 57, lines 11-13.) 
34. Hughes didn't ask any doctor to provide a permanent 
impairment rating for his client. (Hughes' deposition, page 45, 
line 12-14.) 
34. There is no evidence that the client had even been 
released from treatment at the time of settlement. (Hughes' 
deposition, page 73 and 74.) 
35. In fact, Archuleta had not been released from treatment. 
(Archuleta's deposition, page 54, lines 3-5.) 
36. Hughes didn't know the liability limits of the applicable 
policy. (Hughes' deposition, page 64-69.) 
37. Hughes didn't know the minimum limits of liability 
required by law but thought it might be $15,000. (Hughes' 
deposition, page 68, line 15 through page 69 line 10.) 
38. Hughes never corresponded with the insurance company. 
(Hughes' Answers to Interrogatories and Request \tp/ Production of 
Documents.) 
39. Hughes' entire legal file on Archuleta's case contains 
only 21 pages. The are: (1) a form contract; (2) a medical release 
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form; (3) a PIP form; (4) 16 pages of medical bills; (5) a Release 
of All Claims form; and (6) a settlement accounting form [which 
Archuleta denies receiving]. The file contains no correspondence 
of any kind, no pleadings, no notes, no summaries, no medical 
records [only partial bills], no reports, no photos, no repair 
records and no demand package. (Hughes' Answers to Interrogatories 
and Request for Production of Documents.) (Hughes' deposition, 
page 37, line 15-20.) 
40. Hughes did not submit any type of a demand to the 
insurance company, (neither verbally nor in writing). (Hughes' 
deposition, page 112, line 25 to page 113 line 4 and page 12 8.) 
41. Hughes authorized a non-lawyer [Bennett] to initiate and 
conduct settlement discussions with the insurance company. 
(Hughes' deposition pages 111 & 112.) 
42. Hughes did not attend the settlement meeting between 
Bennett and the insurance adjustors. (Hughes' deposition 112, 
lines 8 & 9.) 
43 . Hughes admits he did not have enough control over Bennett 
to even consider him an employee. (Hughes' deposition, page 36, 
lines 13-16.) 
44. At the settlement meeting with the adjustors, the non-
lawyer [Bennett] agreed to accept the insurance company's first 
offer. (Hughes' deposition, page 112-115.) 
45. Hughes recommended that Archuleta accept the insurance 
company's first offer. (Hughes' deposition, page 67, lines 17-19 
and pages 112-115.) 
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46. The offer, the Release of All Claims, the check and the 
accounting were all presented to the client by Bennett, a non-
lawyer. (Hughes' deposition, page 133, line 17-21.) 
47. Hughes retained $1,186.00 from Archuleta's share of the 
settlement [ostensibly to pay unpaid medical bills at Davis 
Hospital] and yet admits he was not retained by Archuleta to settle 
her bills. (Hughes' deposition, page 172, lines 4-7.) 
48. Hughes further admits he did not even know the amount of 
unpaid medical bills. (Hughes' deposition, page 140-141.) 
49. Hughes admits having kept Archuleta's $1,186.00 in an 
account that included his wife (a non-lawyer) as a signatory. 
(Hughes' deposition, page 170, lines 4-20.) 
50. Hughes did not resolve any of the outstanding medical 
bills. (Archuleta's deposition, pages 107-110.) 
51. The employees of Davis Hospital who were responsible for 
the accounts testified that they had no contact with Hughes. 
(Depositions of Carol Stout and Quana Neves.) 
I. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS 
Plaintiff has three separate claims against defendant. Based 
on the undisputed facts of this case, plaintiff is entitled to 
partial Summary Judgement on all three claims. These claims are 
summarized as follows and are explained in more detail in Section 
II of this memorandum. 
1. Plaintiff is entitled to judgement against defendant for 
$800 as the amount of attorney fee charged on the $2,400 of unpaid 
medical expenses that were included in the liability settlement but 
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whicH should have been submitted for payment under the PIP portion 
of plaintiff's own policy. Summary Judgement is mandated because 
Utah law doesn't permit a contingent fee for collection of PIP 
benefits. Furthermore, the contract itself does not provide a fee 
for collecting benefits from the plaintiff's own insurance company. 
2. Plaintiff is entitled to Summary Judgement against 
defendant for fraud because the uncontested facts establish 
constructive fraud. Because of the fraud, plaintiff is entitled to 
judgement against defendant for $2,2 95 as the balance of attorney 
fees paid. ($3,095 less credit for the $800 to which she is 
entitled pursuant to paragraph 1 above.) Plaintiff is further 
entitled to punitive damages pursuant to UCA § 78-18-1 in an amount 
to be determined at trial. Plaintiff is also entitled to a refund 
of all attorney fees paid because the contract itself does not 
provide for a fee for the work done in this case nor for the result 
obtained. 
3. Finally, plaintiff is entitled to judgement for legal 
malpractice. Fraud is per se malpractice. But in addition, the 
uncontested facts of this case show that, as a matter of law, 
defendant's legal representation fell far short of the required 
standard of care for lawyers representing clients in personal 
injury actions. Plaintiff's damages for this malpractice is the 
difference between what her case should have been worth and the 
$5,000 that she actually received. A trial will be required on the 
issue of those damages. 
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II. ARGUMENT 
1. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGEMENT FOR $800 
The $2,400 of unpaid medical expenses should not have been 
included in the liability settlement. Instead, they should have 
been submitted to plaintiff's own PIP insurance carrier. It is 
undisputed that the bills would have been paid if they had been 
submitted. (Uncontested fact #13.) Clearly, if they would have 
been submitted for payment under the PIP policy, no attorney fee 
would have been charged thereon. 
Defendant claims that even if the bills had been paid by PIP 
he still would have been entitled to a one-third fee because of his 
attorney retainer agreement. Defendant is wrong for at least two 
reasons as set forth at f 1(A). and 1(B) below. But before 
addressing those issues, it is appropriate to first examine the 
courts role in determining an attorney's right to charge and 
collect a fee. Courts have inherent supervisory authority to 
decide in a fee dispute whether the contractual attorney's fee is 
reasonable and to refuse to enforce any contract that calls for 
clearly excessive or unreasonable fees. ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual or 
Professional Conduct 41:308 (Sept. 1995) citing Pfeifer v. Sentry 
Ins. , 745 F.Supp. 1434, 1443 (D.C. Wis 1990). When the amount of 
the fee is challenged, the burden of proof as to reasonableness is 
upon the attorney. Pfeifer. supra. Attorney fee agreements must 
be fair, reasonable and fully explained to the client. Such 
contracts are strictly construed against the attorney. Lawyer's 
Manual on Professional Conduct, supra 41:318, citing Severson, 
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Werson, Berke & Melchior v. Bollinger, 1 Cal.Rptr 2d 531 (Calif. 
Ct. App. 1991). 
Both plaintiff and defendant agree that defendant charged a 
one-third contingency fee of $800 for collecting $2,400 of medical 
expenses incurred by plaintiff as a result of her injury. 
(Undisputed Fact #11.) Both parties also agree that the $2,400 of 
medical expenses were never submitted to plaintiff's PIP insurer. 
(Undisputed Fact #12.) And that if the bills had been submitted, 
they would have been paid under the PIP policy. (Undisputed Fact 
#13.) 
Defendant maintains that this action involves a contractual 
dispute over the meaning of the retainer agreement that plaintiff 
and defendant allegedly entered into, with defendant interpreting 
the agreement as authorizing the collection of fees based in part 
on the amount received as PIP benefits. Because of impermissible 
irregularities in the presentation and signing of the agreement, 
plaintiff would dispute the validity of the attorney retainer 
agreement if a trial were required. But even assuming that the 
attorney retainer agreement is valid, defendant's interpretation 
is completely contrary to law. First, because contingent fees for 
the collection of PIP benefits are not permitted by law; and, 
secondly, because the contract in this case does not provide for a 
fee for the work done in this case nor for the result obtained. 
Each of these is explained in more detail below: 
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l.(A) THE CONTINGENT FEE IN THIS CASE IS PROHIBITED BY LAW 
Contingent fees are prohibited for the routine collection of 
PIP benefits. (See Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct, supra, 
41:314 "A common disciplinary problem involves lawyers who charge 
a contingent fee for the recovery of no-fault benefits,...to which 
the client's entitlement is not seriously in doubt.") 
In Opinion 114, issued February 20, 1992 by the Utah State 
Bar's Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee (courtesy copy attached as 
EXHIBIT 2, cited in ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct 
1001:8501 (Sept. 1995) it was held: 
Under the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, [Rule 
1.5(a)] contingent fees charged for the routine filing 
and collection of undisputed PIP or "no fault" claims 
from the client's insurer are unreasonable and excessive. 
State bars, courts, and commentators facing this issue 
uniformly agree that contingent fees charged on the 
recovery or undisputed PIP payments are unreasonable. 
"Contingent fees are generally higher [than fixed fees' 
because receipt of the fee is itself contingent on some 
possibility. Because PIP benefits are virtually 
guaranteed to accident victims a fee contingent on 
receipt of those benefits is likely to be unreasonable." 
(quoting the State Bar of Georgia Op. 37). 
The opinion explained further that the ABA has recognized that 
" [a] contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should 
be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, including 
the risk and uncertainty of the compensation." (emphasis in 
original) . "There must be a realistic risk of non-recovery. " Id. 
Since the "no fault" legislation of many states requires PIP 
coverage, and since payment of these benefits is typically 
generated automatically by filing a claim form with the insurer, 
"there is virtually no risk and the time required for the lawyer is 
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minimal" [Therefore], " [state bar ethics committees and] courts 
uniformly hold that contingent fees are an improper measure of 
professional compensation in such cases." .Id, citing State Bar of 
Georgia Op. 37; South Carolina Bar Op. 83-3; Maryland State Bar 
Association, Formal Opinions 76-1 & 77-4; Attorney Grievance 
Comm'n v. Kemp, 496 A.2d 672 (Md. 1985); POPS & Estrin, P.C. v. 
Reliance Ins. Co. , 562 N.Y.S. 2d 914 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1990); Hausen 
v. Davis, 448 N.Y.S.2d 87 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1981); In re Eanna, 362 
S.E. 2d 632 (S.C. 1987); and Brickman, Contingent Fees Without 
Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. 
Rev. 29, 76-78 (1989) . 
In Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kemp, supra, the Maryland 
Court of Appeals held that a one-third contingent fee in a personal 
injury case was clearly excessive where it was collected by the 
attorney on PIP payments that followed automatically upon the 
filing of a simple form. The court cited a Maryland State Bar 
Association Formal Opinion as follows: 
[I] t would be unethical, in virtually all cases, for a 
lawyer to charge a contingent fee for collecting a claim 
against his client's own insurer under the PIP coverage 
when the attorney has been engaged on a contingent fee 
basis to handle a personal injury claim against a third 
party... [C] ontingent fees are permissible only when 
they are reasonable under all the circumstances, 
including such relevant factors as the risk and 
uncertainly. 
Similarly, in The Florida Bar v. Gentry, 475 So.2d 678, 679 
par. 9 (Fla. 1985), the court found that "[it] was unfair or 
excessive to charge an attorney's fee for personal injury 
protection benefits as to this client because the statute itself 
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provides for reasonable attorney's fee if there is a dispute." 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309 also provides for attorney's fees in 
the event a dispute arises over PIP benefits. There is no rational 
reason to permit a contingent fee when the statute already provides 
for an award of attorney fees in an action to compel payment of PIP 
benefits. 
Even when PIP benefits are not at issue, courts have generally 
adhered to the same rule prohibiting an attorney from collecting a 
contingency fee absent a contingency. Here, there was no 
contingency. The Utah Bar in Opinion 114, supra cited "a 
significant body of case law "supporting" the general conclusion 
that where there is virtually no risk of non-recovery, a contingent 
fee charged by an attorney on the amount of the recovery is 
inappropriate." Citing e.g./ Rosouist v. Soo Line R.R, 692 F.2d 
1107, 1114 (7th Cir. 1982); Donnarumma v. Barracuda Tanker Corp. , 
79 F.R.D. 455, 67 (D.Cal. 1978); Kiser v. Miller. 364 F. Supp. 
1311, 19 (D.D.C. 1973); In Re Swartz. 686 P2d 1236, 3943 
(Ariz.1984); People v. Nutt, 696 P.2d 242 48 (Colo. 1984); 
Anderson v. Kenelly, 547 P2d 260, 61 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); 
Robinson v. Sharp, 66 N.E. 299, 301, (111. 1903); Horton v. 
Butler, 387 So. 2d 1315, 17-18 (La.Ct. App. 1980); Thornton, Sperrv 
& Jensen, Ltd v. Anderson, 352 N.W. 2d 467, 69 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1984); Citizen Bank v. C & H Constr. & Paving Co., 600 P2d 1212, 
18 (N.M. 1979); and Redevelopment Comm'n of Hendersonville v. 
Hyder, 201 S.E. 2d 236, 39 (N.C. Ct. App. 1973). 
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1. (B) THE CONTRACT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR A FEE FOR COLLECTING PIP 
BENEFITS FROM PLAINTIFF'S OWN INSURANCE COMPANY 
The attorney retainer agreement was a contract in writing. 
Therefore, its terms are construed as a matter of law and do not 
present a jury question. As a matter of law, the contract simply 
does not authorize a fee for recovering PIP benefits. In fact, its 
doubtful the contract in this case provides for the payment of any 
fees whatsoever. The agreement is hopelessly ambiguous and does 
not provide for any fee from a settlement unless that settlement is 
"...obtained after trial or within 10 days of the date set for 
trial...". That did not occur in this case as no trial was set 
because no suit was even filed. Clearly the contract is incomplete 
because of missing words or terms but in accordance with well 
established law concerning the interpretation of attorney fee 
agreements^ This subject was addressed by the Utah State Court in 
the case of Phillips v. Smith, 768 P2d 449 (Utah 1989) as follows: 
"In interpreting the contract, we must be mindful of 
the general principle that a court will strictly construe 
terms in a contract against one who is "both the attorney 
draftsman of and a party to the instrument." Continental 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee, 6 Utah 2d 98, 102, 306 P2d 
773, 775 (1957) . We also note that in the present 
circumstances, this principle is reinforced by the fact 
that the instrument at issue relates to an 
attorney/client contingent fee arrangement." Id at 451. 
The first paragraph of the attorney retainer agreement appears 
to be missing a phrase that would indicate the client is retaining 
the attorney. Contingent fee contracts are strictly construed 
against the attorney. But, even if that paragraph were read to 
provide for defendant being retained to represent the plaintiff, it 
would still be limited only to claims against, "...the party or 
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parties responsible for injuries and damages sustained by the 
client...". Clearly, this would include only the tortfeasor and 
would not include Archuleta's own insurance company. After all, 
her insurance company is not, "a party or parties responsible for 
injury and damages sustained by the client". 
An attorney retainer agreement very similar to this one was 
the subject of a prior ruling of the State Bar as reported at page 
23 of the Utah State Bar Journal in January of 1994. In that case, 
the attorney was retained to represent a client in a personal 
injury matter involving the client's son who was struck by an 
automobile. When it was discovered that the motorist was 
uninsured, the attorney filed a claim against the client's own 
insurance company and collected policy limits of $100,000 under the 
uninsured motorist portion of the policy. The attorney kept one-
third of the recovery as a fee. A fee arbitration panel found that 
this was an improper fee because the contract between the attorney 
and client did not contain language providing for a fee on a 
recovery from the client's own insurance company. The attorney was 
admonished for charging an excessive fee and it was ruled that the 
attorney was entitled only to the reasonable value of the services 
rendered. See Utah State Bar Journal article, January 1994, copy 
attached at EXHIBIT 3. 
The contract in this case does not provide for actions against 
plaintiff's own insurance company. Clearly, defendant would not 
have been entitled to a fee for recovering the $2,400 of unpaid 
medical expenses from plaintiff's PIP carrier because the contract 
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doesn't provide for it. He certainly can't claim a fee by 
"slipping" the $2,400 into the liability settlement rather than 
submitting the bills to the PIP carrier. 
Moreover, the attorney retainer agreement in this case only 
provides for an attorney fee in those rare cases where a recovery 
is, "...obtained after trial or within 10 days of the date set for 
trial...". While it is unlikely that this was the intent of the 
parties, still, the law clearly provides that an ambiguous attorney 
retainer agreement is construed against the attorney who is also 
the drafter of that instrument. In this case, there is no way the 
defendant can claim the right to an attorney fee based on the 
attorney retainer agreement. 
2.A. THE DEFENDANT COMMITTED FRAUD AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF 
Plaintiff has alleged fraud based on the fact that Defendant 
Hughes inflated his attorney fee by $800 by settling her personality 
injury claim to include $2,400 of medical expenses that should have 
simply been submitted to her PIP carrier. This was a violation of 
Hughes' duty, when explaining the basis for his contingency fee, to 
disclose to the plaintiff the availability of PIP insurance that 
would automatically pay the medical bills; and to disclose the lack 
of risk in collecting those benefits. 
The Utah Supreme Court has explained that there are two types 
of fraud: actual fraud and constructive fraud. For actual fraud, 
the plaintiff must in the absence of a confidential relationship/ 
prove the defendant knowingly misrepresented a material fact with 
intent to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from action and 
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that the plaintiff, reasonably relying on the misrepresentation 
acted, or failed to act, to his detriment. Blodcrett v. Martsch, 
590 P2d 298 (Utah 1978) . But, if the circumstances are such that 
the defendant could exercise extraordinary influence over the 
plaintiff and the defendant was or should have been aware the 
plaintiff reposed trust and confidence in the defendant and 
reasonably relied on defendant's guidance, then the parties are 
said to be in "confidential relationship" and the plaintiff's 
burden is considerably diminished. "A course of dealing between 
persons so situated is watched with extreme jealousy and 
solicitude, and if there is found the slightest trace of undue 
influence or unfair advantage, redress will be given to the injured 
party." Id at 3 02. 
The law presumes an attorney-client relationship to be just 
such a confidential relationship. £d at 3i>i. The breach of duty 
by the dominant party in a confidential relationship may be 
regarded as constructive fraud. "It is unnecessary for the 
plaintiff to show an intent to defraud; constructive fraud is an 
equitable doctrine employed by the courts to rectify injury 
resulting from breach of the obligation implicit in the 
relationship." Id at 302. See also: Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P2d 
766 (Utah 1985); Harrell v. Branson, 344 So.2d 604 (Fla.App. 1977) 
("Constructive fraud may exist independent of an intent to 
defraud...[E]guity...attributes the same or similar effects as 
those that follow from actual fraud and. . .gives the same or similar 
relief.") 
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"If a confidential relationship is found to exist between 
parties, any transaction that benefits the party in whom trust is 
reposed is presumed to have been unfair and to have resulted from 
undue influence and fraud. . .The benefiting party then bears the 
burden of persuading the fact finder by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the transaction was in fact fair and not the result 
of fraud or undue influence. If that burden is not carried, the 
transaction will be set aside." Von Hake, supra. 
It has been explained by the Utah State Bar's Ethics Advisory 
Opinion Committee that the client must be "fully informed as to the 
degree of risk justifying a contingent fee." Opinion 114. The 
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals explained further that the 
requirement that a client be fully informed especially applies to 
a contingent-fee contract. "The client needs to be fully informed 
as to the degree of risk justifying a contingent fee. . .The clearest 
case where there would be an absence of real risk would be a case 
in which an attorney attempts to collect from a client a supposedly 
contingent fee for obtaining insurance proceeds for a client when 
there is no indication that the insurer will resist the claim." 
Committee on Legal Ethics v. Tatterson, 352 S.E.2d 107, 114-15 
(1986) . 
In Tatterson, the court found the attorney in that case 
misrepresented the difficulty in obtaining life insurance proceeds 
for a client. The court found that, in so doing the attorney 
violated disciplinary Rule 1-102(A) (4) which provides that an 
attorney "shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
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deceit, or misrepresentation." 
A similar finding was made by the Illinois Supreme Court in In 
re Gerard, 548 N.E.2d 1051 (1989), where it was held that 
" [c] ollecting an excessive fee in and of itself can constitute 
fraud subject to discipline under Rule 1-102(A)(4); intent to 
defraud or deceive is not an element." 
In In re Gerard, the court found there was clear and 
convincing evidence that the attorney never explained to the client 
the simple procedures he used to collect her money; and that by 
failing to explain this to the client while collecting a large fee, 
the attorney engaged in fraudulent conduct by omission. See also 
Homa v- Friendly Mobile Manor, 612 A.2d 322 (Md.App. 1992) (" [T] he 
nondisclosure of a material fact can also constitute fraud where a 
duty of disclosure exists. Where there is a fiduciary 
relationship, a duty of disclosure is imposed. A fiduciary 
relationship exists between an attorney and the client and carry 
with it the requirement of utmost good faith and loyalty and the 
obligation of [the fiduciary relationship] ) ; Cornel1 v. Wunchel; 
408 N.W.2d 369 (Iowa 1987) ("Concealment of or failure to disclose 
a material fact can constitute fraud in Iowa...To be actionable, 
the concealment must be by a party under a duty to communicate the 
concealed fact. . .A duty to disclose material facts arises. . .when it 
is shown that one of the parties has superior knowledge or a 
special situation, such as an attorney-client relationship, exists 
between the parties. 
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The court in In re Gerard further found there was constructive 
fraud by virtue of the attorney-client relationship, and that the 
fiduciary duty was breached when the attorney collected the 
excessive fee and then failed to initiate a renegotiation of that 
fee when it was discovered that his client's rights to the money 
were not being challenged* 
The court specifically found that intent to defraud was not 
necessary and that ignorance of the law and of the disciplinary 
rules was no excuse. The court explained as follows: 
We would have thought it was general knowledge among 
the members of the bar that a contingent fee is to be 
collected only if an attorney successfully champions the 
legal rights and claims of his client, with the result 
that the client is compensated through a settlement with, 
or judgement against, those who denied his claims. 
Respondent's defense in this proceeding is 
ignorance...But if respondent, realizing his ignorance of 
contingent fees..., had sought to remedy it by doing the 
research necessary to draft a proper contingent fee 
agreement, presumably he would not now be before us; . . . 
Respondent comments in his brief that [the client] 
never asked him to renegotiate his fee...But a client's 
acquiescence to an attorney's misconduct does not purge 
it of its unethical character. 
Where, as here, an attorney-client relationship existed, the 
parties entered into a contingent fee contract, and the attorney 
failed to disclose that payment of the plaintiff's medical expenses 
was automatic and involved little or no risk, it was fraudulent of 
the attorney to collect a portion of the medical expenses as part 
of his contingency fee. As the dominant party in the confidential 
relationship such a breach is regarded as constructive fraud. 
It has been held that an attorney who is guilty of actual 
fraud or bad faith toward his client, or who violates the 
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requirements of his professional responsibility, is not entitled to 
any compensation for his services. 7 Am Jur 2d Attorneys at Law § 
260 p. 207. 
The undisputed facts of this case mandate that plaintiff be 
granted Summary Judgement that defendant has committed fraud for 
the reasons set forth above. As such, plaintiff is entitled to a 
full refund of her attorney fees of $3,095 (less credit for the 
$800 that should be awarded pursuant to paragraph 1 above) . 
2.B. BECAUSE OF THE FRAUD, PLAINTIFF IS ALSO ENTITLED TO PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES IN AN AMOUNT TO BE DETERMINED AT TRIAL, 
An attorney is liable for any loss sustained by his client as 
a result of the attorney's fraud. 7 Am Jur 2d Attorneys at Law § 
215 p. 258. Punitive damages are awarded pursuant to statute, only 
if compensatory da-mages are awarded and "it is established by clear 
and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the 
tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally 
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and 
reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of 
others." Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1 (1) (a) . 
It has been held that, where a court ordered the return on 
money received by an attorney as a contingency fee based upon his 
breach of fiduciary duty, that constituted a compensatory damage 
award and was sufficient basis for the further award of punitive 
damages. Homa v. Friendly Mobile Manor, 612 A.2d 322 (Md.App. 
1992) . 
In Cumminas v. Pinder, 574 A.2d 843 (Del.Supr. 1990), the 
court found that, " . . .while ordinary negligence will not suffice to 
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support an award of punitive damages/ intentional or willful 
conduct with reckless disregard f or the interests of a client may 
subject an attorney to. . .punitive damages." The court in o™™inqs 
v.Pinder awarded punitive damages in an amount reasonably 
proportionate to the amount of compensatory damages where the 
attorney failed to advise his client fully concerning her right to 
pursue a claim against her own insurance carrier; unilaterally 
increased the contingency fee; and intentionally stopped payment on 
an insurance company check endorsed to his client. In this case, 
Hughes is guilty of very much the same conduct. 
In Homa v. Friendly Mobile Manor, supra, the Court explained 
that punitive damages are awarded to punish conduct characterized 
by "evil motive, intent or injure or fraud," (emphasis in original) 
and defined "actual malice" "as conduct characterized by evil 
motive, intent to injure, ill will or fraud." (emphasis in 
original) . The court found that intent to injure need not 
accompany fraudulent conduct to meet this standard of actual 
malice. The court held further that: 
Punitive damages may be awarded in an action for 
deceit "where the wrong involved some violation of duty 
springing from a relationship of trust or confidence, or 
where the fraud is gross, or the case presents other 
extraordinary or exceptional circumstances clearly 
indicating malice and wilfulness, quoting Finch v. Hughes 
Aircraft Co., 469 A.2d 867 (1984)... 
In Finch, we found gross fraud where the attorney 
violated his fiduciary duty to his client by submitting 
to his client false and fraudulent bills, over-charging 
his client by $23,077 for professional services. 
Similarly, the New Mexico Court of Appeals, in Rodrigues v. 
Horton, 622 P2d 261 (1980) held that punitive damages were properly 
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awarded against an attorney when his conduct was maliciously 
intentional fraudulent, or committed with a wanton disregard of the 
plaintiff's rights. The attorney in that case misled his client 
about a settlement, settled a different claim without authorization 
and charged excessive fees for miscellaneous services. The court 
found that the amount awarded as punitive damages was appropriate 
as long as it is not so unrelated to the actual damages as to 
manifest passion and prejudice. 
3. PIAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGEMENT THAT DEFENDANT 
COMMITTED MALPRACTICE 
Fraud is per se malpractice. But in addition, as a matter of 
law, defendant's conduct throughout his representation of plaintiff 
in the underlying action falls far short of the standard of care 
required for attorneys. This is true for at least two reasons as 
set forth below. First, the actions of Bennett, a non-lawyer 
clearly constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. Defendant's 
conduct in assisting and participating in this unauthorized 
practice of law constitutes malpractice. A lawyer is prohibited 
from assisting any person in the performance of activity that 
constitutes the unauthorized practice of law or from sharing legal 
fees with a nonlawyer or forming a partnership with a nonlawyer 
involving the practice of law. Rules 5.4 5.5, Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
In Louisiana State bar Ass'n v. Edwins, 540 So.2d 295 (La. 
1989), an attorney entered a relationship with a paralegal which 
resulted in the paralegal performing legal tasks without 
supervision and exercising professional judgement reserved only for 
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attorneys. The client testified and the court found that the 
paralegal held himself out to be a lawyer, entered an employment 
and contingent fee contract with the client, and did not reveal he 
was not a lawyer and arrange for the client to meet the actual 
lawyer until after the suit had been filed. In this case, Hughes 
never met his client even thought the case was settled. 
The court in Louisiana State bar Ass'n v. Edwins, supra found 
that delegation of work by a lawyer is proper only if the lawyer 
maintains a direct relationship with his client, supervises the 
delegated work, and has professional responsibility for the work 
product. Under the facts indicated above, the court found the 
attorney knowingly assisted the paralegal in the unauthorized 
practice of law. 
Similarly, the Utah State Bar admonished an attorney for 
failure to supervise a legal assistant, and publicly reprimanded a 
different attorney for failure to supervise nonlawyer assistants. 
Vol. 6, #7 Utah Bar Journal, Discipline Corner, pp. 24-25 
(Aug./Sept. 1993) . In the latter case, the lawyer permitted a 
paralegal to meet with a client and provide advice. Similarly, a 
private reprimand was given to an attorney when a nonlawyer 
assistant interviewed a client, took the information relating to a 
bankruptcy, advised the client as to the nature of the bankruptcy 
to be filed, and prepared the bankruptcy schedules. The attorney 
did not meet with the client until the first meeting with the 
creditors. Vol. 6, #1 Utah Bar Journal, Discipline Comer, p. 22 
(Jan. 1993) . 
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Pursuant to the case law and the rules of professional 
conduct, the actions of this defendant in permitting Bennett to 
present the attorney retainer agreement, fill in portions of that 
agreement, initiate and conduct settlement negotiations, present 
the terms of the settlement to the client, and present the Release 
of All Claims to the client constitutes assisting a non-lawyer in 
the unauthorized practice of law. Since an attorney who violates 
his professional responsibility to a client is not entitled to any 
compensation for his services, the contingency fee contract entered 
into between the plaintiff and defendant should be set aside by 
this court and plaintiff granted judgement for the full amount of 
the fee charged. 
In addition to the fraud and assisting in the unauthorized 
practice of law, the undisputed facts of this case establish 
malpractice as a matter of law. Hughes never met his client. He 
only recalled talking to her twice over the phone. His client's 
phone number wasn't even in his legal file. Hughes never sent any 
type of correspondence to his client and he never telephoned her. 
He told his client he would investigate the case but he didn't talk 
to the driver who was alleged to have caused the wreck. He didn't 
talk to the police officer who investigated the collision. He 
never spoke to the person who witnesses the collision. He never 
spoke to any insurance adjustor about liability. He doesn't 
specifically recall talking to any insurance adjustor about 
anything until after the case was settled. All three of the 
adjustors who worked on the file testified that they never spoke to 
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the defendant and didn' t even know he was involved in the case 
until after it was settled. 
Hughes didn't file suit and didn't do any discovery. He 
didn't obtain repair records for the car and didn't know how much 
damage had been done to his clients car, 
Hughes never spoke to his client's doctor. He didn't request 
that his client be evaluated by an orthopedic specialist even 
though she had an orthopedic injury and an MRI had revealed a 
bulging disk. Defendant never asked amy doctor to provide a 
permanent impairment rating for his client. Plaintiff hadn't even 
been released from treatment at the time the defendant recommended 
that she accept $5,000 as her share of the settlement. 
Defendant didn't know the liability limits of the applicable 
policy and thought that the minimum limits of liability required by 
law was only $15,000. 
Defendant never corresponded with the insurance company. His 
entire legal file contained only 21 pages, five of which were forms 
and 16 of which were medical bills. (There is evidence that even 
the medical bills were obtained after the settlement.) The file 
contained no correspondence of any kind. No pleadings. No notes. 
No summaries. No medical records [only partial bills]. No 
reports. No photos. No repair records. No demand package. 
Hughes did not submit a written demand to the insurance 
company and didn't even make a verbal demand. Hughes authorized a 
non-lawyer to initiate and conduct the settlement discussions with 
the insurance company. Hughes didn't even attend the settlement 
6 - 26 -
meeting. The non-lawyer agreed to accept the insurance company's 
first offer and Hughes recommend the plaintiff accept it. 
As a matter of law, the attorney's actions in this case do not 
meet the standard of care required of an attorney in a personal 
injury action. Essentially he did no work at all. The only thing 
he even claims to have done was to speak to the client over the 
phone and to have authorized a non-lawyer to handle her case. 
Clearly, plaintiff is entitled to Summary Judgement on the issue of 
attorney malpractice. 
Plaintiff's damages for defendant's malpractice equals the 
amount that her personal injury case was worth less the $5,000 she 
actually received. Plaintiff is entitled a trial on this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff is entitled to Summary Judgement against defendant 
for $800 as the amount of the attorney fee charged for including 
unpaid medical expenses in a liability settlement when PIP 
insurance was available to pay the expenses. Plaintiff is further 
entitled to Summary Judgement that defendant has committed a fraud 
against plaintiff. Because of the fraud, plaintiff is entitled to 
a refund of the entire attorney fee charged in this matter and is 
further entitled to punitive damages in an amount to be determined 
at trial. In addition, the contract doesn't provide for any fee in 
the circumstances of the underlying case. 
Plaintiff is further entitled to Summary Judgement on the 
issue of malpractice because as a matter of law defendant's conduct 
fails to meet the standard of care required of an attorney 
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representing a client in a personal action. Plaintiff's is 
entitled to a trial on the issue of damages as a result of 
defendant's malpractice. 
The only issues to be tried are defendant's actual damages as 
a result of malpractice and the amount of punitive damages to which 
plaintiff is entitled because of defendant's fraud. 
n-i-q<- V-L, U iw 
Date Daniel L. Wilson 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Mailed To: Donald C. Hughes 
P.O. Box 27611 
St. Louis, MO 63146 
Date Signature 
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ATTORNEY RETAINER AGREEMENT 
In consideration of the legal services to be rendered by Attorney 
Donald C. Hughes, hereinafter referred to as Attorney, for any claims that 
r U h r U 4 f-'y U\i 1 /'/*;. hereinafter referred to as Client, may have against the 
party or parties responsible for injuries and damages sustained by Client on or 
about the \*j day of r ^ . 19 ^a r i s ing from a certain occurrence in 
1 i\-/. County, State of (. 7 61. . briefly described as fol lows:_ 
i ;. i > -i r J&r~' (;r{ 11 <~ ', r r • . 
Client hereby authorizes Attorney to commence and prosecute said 
claim and assigns to Attorney a lien of / ^ . ( v/; %) of all amounts 
recovered by compromise, settlement or judgment obtained after trial or within 
10 days of the dale set for trial. It is understood by Client that this agreement 
extends only through preparation and trial of the claim, and not to the defense 
or prosecution of any appeal that may be required. 
IF NO RECOVERY IS OBTAINED, NO FEE SHALL DE 
PAYABLE TO ATTORNEY. 
The parties to this agreement further agree as follows: 
All expenses of investigation, preparation, and suit including doctors 
reports, reports of other experts, witness fees, filing fees and other court costs 
shall be paid as follows: k I / , • i l l 
hkiHMxj />/ ••-Vrlr./.Acu f 
Drue 
Any costs or expenses advances by Attorney shall be reimbursed in full 
from Clients share of any recovery. 
Attorney retains the right to employ associate counsel of his choice and 
at his expense. Attorney further retains the right to withdraw from the case for 
any reason and at any tunc upon proper notice to Client. 
Client agrees not to drop the action or withdraw in the absence of 
Attorney's express written recommendation to do so. Client further agrees not 
to negotiate, discuss, or accept any settlement of this matter from any 
individual, corporation, firm or other entity unless preseuted to Client by 
Attorney. 
Client agrees to keep Attorney advised of his whereabouts at all times 
and to cooperate in the preparation and trial of the case, to appear upon 
reasonable notice for depositions and court appearances, and to comply with all 
reasonable requests made of him by Attorney in connection with the preparation 
and prosecution of this case. 
If Attorney is discharged before conclusion of the case, client agrees 
to pay an attorney fee of $90.00 per hour for time spent on this case, plus costs 
incurred. 
Client hereby authorizes Attorney to release any and all hospital 
records, to the parties responsible for client's injuries, or their attorneys and 
insurance companies when deemed necessary by Attorney to obtain a recovery. 
Attorney agrees to prosecute client's claim with reasonable diligence 
and vigor. 
Client grants Attorney a lien on his claim for Attorney's fees and costs 
and authorizes Attorney to retain his fee and costs from any amount recovered 
by compromise, judgement or otherwise. 
Client acknowledges that any claim such as the one involved in this 
case is by its nature unpredictable and that Attorney has made no representation 
as to what amount, if any, client may be entitled to recover. 
Client 
NOTE: THIS IS A CONTRACT. It protects both you and your attorney 
and will prevent misunderstandings. Read it carefully. Please discussed or if 
you have any questions. 
UTAH STATE BAR 
ETHICS ADVISORY OPINION COMMITTEE 
Opinion No, 114 . 
(Approved February 20, 1992) 
Issue: Is a one-third contingency fee charged by an attorney unreasonable or 
excessive if the recovery includes personal injury protection ("PIP" or "no fault") 
payments from the client's insurer? 
Opinion: Under the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, which require that a 
lawyer's fee be reasonable,1 contingent fees charged for the routine filing and collec-
tion of undisputed PIP or "no fault" claims from the client's insurer are unreasonable 
and excessive.2 State bars, courts, and commentators facing this issue uniformly 
agree that contingent fees charged on the recovery of undisputed PIP payments are 
unreasonable. "Contingent fees are generally higher [than fixed fees] because receipt 
of the fee is itself contingent on some possibility. Because PIP benefits are virtually 
guaranteed to accident victims a fee contingent on receipt of those benefits is likely 
to be unreasonable."3 
Analysis of Authority: The validity and utility of the contingent fee was long 
ago recognized in the United States. It is justified mainly because it is often the only 
HJtah Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(a). 
^This Opinion is intended to address only those situations in which undisputed 
PIP benefits arc obtained from the client's insurer. This Opinion does not address 
the propriety of contingent fees in less obvious cases- For example, when a client 
has been offered a settlement from an adverse party's insurer, and then retains an 
attorney to assist the client in obtaining a greater recovery than that already offered, 
a question may arise concerning the ethical propriety of a contingent fee that in-
cludes a percentage of the total recovery. The issue of whether an attorney may 
properly receive a contingent fee on the eventual recovery without first deducting 
from the recovery that amount offered prior to the attorney's retention is not cov-
ered by this Opinion. 
3State Bar of Georgia Op. 37, Lair's Manual on Professional Conduct § 801:2703 
(ABA/BNA Jan. 20, 1984). 
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way that "a person of ordinary means may prosecute a just claim to judgment"4 
Due to its vast potential for abuse, however, the contingent fee must be regulated/ 
Accordingly, the ABA has recognized that "[a] contract for a contingent fee, where 
sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, 
including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation"* Implicit in the concept of 
the contingent fee is the notion that there is an actual contingency upon which the 
attorney's chances of being compensated are based. In other words, there must be a 
realistic risk of nonrecovery. A fairly large body of case law supports this general 
conclusion.7 Commentators also agree,8 
*In re Swartz, 636 R2d 1236, 1242 (Ariz. 1984), quoting Note, Lawyer's Tight-
Rope—Use and Abuse of Fees, 41 Cornell L-Q. 633, 689 (1956). 
5Id. 
6ABA Canons of Professional Ethics 13 (emphasis added). 
7Rg., Rosquist v., Soo Line R.R., 692 E2d 1107, 1114 (7th Cir. 1982); 
Donnammma v. Barracuda Tanker Corp., 79 F.R.D. 455, 467 (D. Cal. 1978); Kiser v. 
Miller, 364 E Supp. 1311, 1319 (DJD.C 1973); In re Swartz, 6$6 R2d 1236, 1239-43 
(Ariz. 1984); People v. Nutt, 696 R2d 242, 24S (Colo. 1934); Anderson v. Kenelly, 
547 P.2d 260, 261 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); Robinson v. Sharp, 66 N.E. 299, 301 (HI. 
1903); Horton v. Butler, 387 So. 2d 1315, 1317-18 (La. Ct. App. 1980), cert, denied, 
394 So, 2d 607 (La. 1980); Thornton, Spcrry &. Jensen, Ltd v. Anderson, 352 N.W.2d 
467, 469 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Citizens Bank v. C & H Construction & Paving Co,, 
600 R2d 1212, 1218 (N.M. 1979); Redevelopment Comm'n of Hcndersonville v. 
Hyder, 201 S.E.2d 236, 239 (N.C Ct. App. 1973); Committee on Legal Ethics v. 
Tatterson, 352 S.R2d 107, 113-14 (W. Va. 1986). 
8
 Annotation, Reasonableness of Contingent Fee in Personal Injury Action, 46 Am. 
Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 1, 24-27 (1986). According to this annotation: 
A larger fee may be authorized in a case in which the fee de-
pends entirely on the attorney's success than in one in which the attor-
ney is to be paid regardless of the outcome. It is said that contingent 
compensation is properly larger than absolute compensation, because 
the extent of the services required cannot be predicted when the fee 
agreement is made, and because the attorney's services are at his peril. 
* * * * 
Disputes over the reasonableness of contingent fee contracts 
often involve a question of the actual degree of risk assumed by the 
attorney in accepting the case. If there is little risk involved in the 
litigation, the fact that the attorney was retained on a contingent fee 
basis may be entitled to little weight in assessing the reasonableness of 
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During the last twenty years, many states have adopted "no fault" legislation 
mandating that all automobile owners carry PIP coverage. "The purpose behind this 
legislatively mandated requirement 'is to assure financial compensation to victims of 
motor vehicle accidents without regard to the fault of the named insured or other 
persons entitled to PIP benefits/"9 In the vast majority of these cases "payment is 
generated automatically by simply filing a standard one page claim form with the 
insurer."10 "Since there is virtually no risk and the time to be required to the law-
yer is minimal, [state bar ethics committees and] courts uniformly hold that contin-
gent fees are an improper measure of professional compensation in such cases."11 
State bars that have considered this matter have stated their positions clearly 
and concisely. According to the State Bar of Georgia: 
Generally a lawyer may not charge a fee contingent on a client's re-
ceipt of PIP benefits (accident insurance providing compensation to 
injured persons without regard to fault). Contingent fees are generally 
higher because receipt of the fee is itself contingent on some possibili-
ty. Since PIP benefits are virtually guaranteed to accident victims a fee 
contingent on receipt of those benefits is likely to be unreasonable.12 
The South Carolina Bar agrees: 
A lawyer may not consider .the amounts recovered from the client's 
personal injury protection insurance coverage in determining the per-
centage of his contingent fee unless the insurer denies coverage be-
cause of a good faith question concerning the causal connection be-
the contracted fee. 
Id. at 25. See also Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without 
the Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 29, 76-78 (1989) (noting that although 
explicit judicial and scholarly statements about the risk requirement are rare, "[tjhey 
occur primarily in cases involving recovery under 'no fault' statutes, insurance claims, 
and claims under a statute providing for the recovery of attorney's fees"). 
9
 Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kemp, 496 A.2d 672, 678 (Md. 1985), quoting 
Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins, Co. v. Gartelman, 416 A-2d 734, 736 (Md. 
1980). 
l0Id. 
nBrickman, supra note 8, at 78. 
iZState Bar of Georgia Op. 37; Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct 
§ 801:2703 (ABA/BNA Jan. 20, 1984). 
114-3 
$~ 3* 
tween the injury and accident. Only when there is a question concern-
ing the availability of coverage are the lawyer's time, labor, skill and 
expertise instrumental in establishing the injury resulting from the 
accident. Those factors are not needed when the insurer admits liabili-
ty or the insurer makes a bad faith denial of coverage. The client must 
be fully informed and should make the decision whether a fixed fee 
may be reasonable.13 
Similarly, the Maryland State Bar Association has concluded that "[w]hen 
there is virtually no risk and no uncertainty, contingent fees represent an improper 
measure of professional compensation" and thus charging a contingent fee for collec-
tion of PIP benefits is "unreasonable and unconscionable."14 
For these reasons, many attorneys handling personal injury matters on 
a contingent fee basis submit the PIP claim as a perfunctory accommo-
dation to the client- However, since filling out forms of a legal nature, 
simple though they may be, is certainly part of a lawyer's work, the 
Committee feels that a reasonable charge based on the time actually 
spent in the preparation of the claim may be ethically charged. Also, if 
a genuine dispute arises with the insurance carrier requiring the attor-
ney to perform substantial legal services to establish coverage and to 
generate recovery, of course, he may make an appropriate charge 
based on time spent and other relevant factors, and, in some cases, 
based on a contingent fee arrangement. 
Courts facing this issue agree that contingent fees charged by an attorney for 
the recovery of PIP payments are almost always inappropriate.15 In Attorney Griev-
ance Cornm'n v. Kemp,16 the Maryland Court of Appeals held that a one-third 
contingent fee in a personal injury case was clearly excessive where it was collected 
by the attorney on PIP payments that followed automatically upon the filing of a 
13South Carolina Bar Op. 83-3, Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct Sec. 
801:7907 (ABA/BNA undated). 
14FormaI Opinions of the Maryland State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics 76-1 
and 77-4 (1976). 
15See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Cornm'n v. Kemp, 496 A.2d 672 (Md. 1985); Pops 
& Estrin, PC. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 562 N.Y.S.2d 914 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1990); Hausen v. 
Davis, 448 RY.S.2d 87 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1981); In re Hanna, 362 S.E.2d 632 (S.C. 
1987); see also Brickman, supra note 8, at 78. 
16496 A.2d 672, 677-79 (Md. 1985). 
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simple form.17 Referring to a 1976 Maryland State Bar Association Formal Opin-
ion,18 the court stated: 
[I]t would be unethical, in virtually all cases, for a lawyer to charge a 
contingent fee for collecting a claim against his client's own insurer 
under the PEP coverage when the attorney has been engaged on a 
contingent fee basis to handle a personal injury claim against a third 
party. • * • [Cjontingent fees are permissible 'only when they are reason-
able under all the circumstances, including such relevant factors as the 
risk and uncertainty.19 
A significant body of case law also supports the general conclusion that where 
there is virtually no risk of nonrecovery, a contingent fee charged by an attorney on 
the amount of the recovery is inappropriate.20 For example, in Committee on Legal 
Ethics v. Tatterson}11 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that 
disbarment was warranted where, while other disciplinary proceedings were pending 
against him, an attorney charged a one-third contingent fee to collect the undisputed 
proceeds of a life insurance policy. The court found that such a contingent fee was 
not justified, stating: 
The client needs to be fully informed as to the degree of risk justifying 
a contingent fee. Courts generally have insisted that a contingent fee 
lsSee supra note 14. 
19Kemp, 496 A.2d at 678. It appears that every other court facing this issue has 
reached the same conclusion. See Pops & Estrin P.C. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 562 
N.Y.S.2d 914, 915 (N.Y. Civ. Q. 1990) (holding that "an attorney and his client may 
enter into a private arrangement to collect a fee in connection with the representa-
tion in a no fault matter. This arrangement is perfectly valid so long as the terms of 
the agreement are not put in the form of a contingency fee."); Hausen v. Davis, 44S 
N.Y.S.2d 87, 89 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1981) (holding that where the attorney had secured 
a contingent fee on a no fault claim in the same way that he had done in the person-
al injury action and where the insurer had never denied the claim and payment was 
made on the no fault claim within 30 days of submission the contingent fee on the 
no-fault claim was unreasonable); In re Hanna, 362 S.E.2d 632 (S.C 1987) (holding 
that an attorney representing a client in a personal injury or wrongful death action 
on a contingency basis should not charge for collecting PIP benefits, unless the PIP 
claim is disputed or denied). 
™See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
2I352 S.E.2d 107 (W. Va. 1986). 
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be truly contingent. The typically elevated contingent fee reflecting the 
risk to the attorney of receiving no fee will usually be permitted only if 
the representation indeed involves a significant degree of risk. The 
clearest case where there would be an absence of real risk would be a 
case in which an attorney attempts to collect from a client a supposedly 
contingent fee for obtaining insurance proceeds for a client when there 
is no indication that the insurer will resist the claim. In the absence of 
any real risk, an attorney's purportedly contingent fee which is grossly 
disproportionate to the amount of work required is 'clearly an excessive 
fee' zz 
Conclusion: Based upon the above authorities and reasoning, it is clear that 
in the vast majority of cases, a contingent fee charged for the routine filing and 
recovery of undisputed PIP benefits is unreasonable and thus unethical under Utah 
Rules of Professional Conduct 1,5. 





An attorney was Admonished for 
.narging an excessive fee in violation of 
Rule 1.5(a), FEES of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct based upon a 
recommendation by a Screening Panel of 
the Ethics and Discipline Committee. The 
attorney was retained to represent a client 
in a personal injury matter involving the 
client's son who was struck by an automo-
bile. When it was discovered that the 
motorist was uninsured the attorney filed a 
claim against the client's own insurance 
company and collected policy limits of 
$100,000.00 under the uninsured motorist 
portion of the policy. The attorney kept 
one-third as a fee. A fee arbitration panel 
found this was an improper fee in that the 
contingency fee agreement between the 
attorney and the client did not include 
;ecovery from the client's own insurance 
company. Therefore, the attorney was 
entided only to the reasonable value of the 
services rendered. 
Utah State Bar Journal 
January 1994, page 23 
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MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 940700264 
Judge Dawson 
Comes now Don Hughes and submits the following memorandum in 
opposition to plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. 
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Summary judgment is only appropriate if there are no undisputed 
material issues of fact On summary judgment the facts are interpreted in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Sandy City v Salt Lake City, 827 
P2d 212 (Utah 1992); Rollins v Petersen, 813 P2d 1156 (Utah 1991); Rutherford v 
AT&T CommunicaHons of Mountain States, 844 P2d 949 (Utah 1992). In the context 
of claims against attorneys the facts are also viewed in favor of the non-moving 
party. "It is only necessary for the non-moving party to show 'facts' 
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controverting the 'facts ' asserted by the moving party." Breuer-Harrison v Combe, 
799 P2d 727, 728 (Utah App 1990). 
Plaintiff has chosen not to cite any Utah authorities relating to attorney 
malpractice. The only Utah authority case related to an attorney client dispute 
referenced by plaintiff is Phillips v Smith, 768 P2d 449 (Utah 1989). This case is a 
dispute over an attorney's lien. The question posed to the court is what happens 
when the parties fail to cover certain eventualities, such as the early termination 
of counsel on contingent fee agreement The holding of the court was that 
ordinary contract law applies to interpretation of contingent fee agreements. 
There is good reason plaintiff has avoided the Utah case authorities. They 
are uniformly against the position of plaintiff. The necessary elements of a claim 
against an attorney are well established in Utah law. The Court of Appeals in 
Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v Combe 799 P2d 716, 727 (Utah 1990) says, "Once this 
[attorney client] relationship is proven, the client has the burden of showing two 
additional elements: 1) negligence on the part of the attorney, and 2) that such 
negligence was the proximate cause of damage to the client" The court cites 
Dunn v McKay Burton and Thurman, 584 P2d 894, 896 (Utah 1978) as authority for 
this statement 
"The elements of legal malpractice include: (1) an attorney-client 
relationship; (2) a duty of the attorney to the client; (3) a breach of that duty; and 
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(4) damages suffered by the client proximately caused by the attorney's breach 
of duty." Harline v Barker 854 P2d 595, 598 (Utah App 1993). 
Whether an attorney breached the standard of care is an issue of fact " A 
genuine issue of fact exists where, on the facts in the record, reasonable minds 
could differ on whether defendant's conduct measures up to the required 
standard/' Jackson v Dabney, 645 P2d 615 (Utah 1982). 
The standard of care is determined by expert testimony. Utah, as 
virtually every jurisdiction requires the standard of professional care be proven 
by expert testimony. The standard of care is a question of fact to be determined 
through expert testimony. Kellas v Sawilosky, 322 SE2d 897 (GA1984); Grose v 
Belline 486 NE2d 398 (1985); Brown v Small 825 P2d 1209 (Mont 1992); Boigegrain v 
Gilbert, 784 P2d 849 (Colo App 1989); Somma v Gracey 544 A2d 668 (1988). 
After the standard of care is proven the plaintiff must prove the 
defendant breached the standard and that there are damages proximately caused 
by the breach of the standard. This is the trial within a trial referenced supra. 
"Proximate cause is an issue of fact" Harline supra at 600. See also Swift Stop, 
Inc. v Wight, 845 P2d 250, 253 (Utah App 1992). 
These are the legal doctrines enunciated by the Utah appellate courts 
applying to claims against attorneys. None of this body of law is cited by the 
plaintiff. The requirements of proving a duty and applicable the standard of 
care i$ for expert opinion. In this particular case the reasons fof expert testimony 
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apply. The claimed breach is not simple such as a missed statute of limitations 
but is "constructive" duties asserted by plaintiffs counsel. Evaluation of the 
standard of care requires the assistance of expert witnesses. 
DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs attorney has set out approximately 6 pages of what he claims to 
be undisputed facts. Virtually all of the so called undisputed facts are either 
false, misstatements of the record or wholly taken out of context. The so called 
undisputed facts of the plaintiff are denied and a detailed statement of facts 
controverting the "facts" of plaintiff are stated below. The following statement 
of facts relies on the affidavit of Don Hughes and citation to relevant points in 
the record. 
1. Hughes was contacted by phone in St. Louis, Missouri by Maxine 
Archuleta on or about October 19,1993 requesting that he represent her in a 
potential claim for injuries suffered in an automobile accident. Ron Bennett and 
the plaintiff were on the phone when defendant answered. 
2. Before contacting Hughes, Maxine Archuleta claims to have been 
referred to Ron Bennett, a licensed public adjuster by her friend Vsana Skinner. 
She claims, " ...Vsana skinner referred me—you know, she contacted Ron about 
the accident I was in. Irene knows Ron. Q. Thaf s Irene Roche? A. Yes, and —" 
Archuleta deposition at page 65. Plaintiff sought out Don Hughes to retain him. 
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3. Maxine Archuleta executed the retainer agreement attached hereto as 
Exhibit A on October 23,1993 in the presence of Ron Bennett 
4. Maxine Archuleta's initial medical bills totaling $618 were submitted 
to Allstate Insurance as PEP carrier. Allstate paid these initial bills. See drafts 
attached to the deposition of Sandra Mcintosh. Maxine Archuleta handled the 
routine submission of these bills herself. See application for PIP benefits 
attached to deposition of Sandra Mcintosh. No attorney's fee was taken by 
Hughes on any of the routinely submitted bills. See affidavit of Don Hughes 
and application for PIP benefits attached to the deposition of Sandra Mcintosh. 
5. On November 17,1993 Maxine Archuleta had an MRL The results 
were: "Discs appear essentially unremarkable at all levels. There may be a 
minuscule annular bulge at C3-4 but no evidence of herniation extruded 
fragment or foraminal compromise. Cord intrinsically normal without evidence 
of mass, syninx, etc. No evidence of congenital or acquired spinal stenosis. 
IMPRESSION: ESSENTIALLY NORMAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE SCAN, 
CERVICAL SPINE WITH ABOVE OBSERVATIONS." (emphasis in original) See 
report attached to the deposition of Sandra Mcintosh. 
6. On January 7,1994 Sandra Mcintosh as claim representative of Allstate 
Insurance PIP benefits sent a letter to Maxine Archuleta's physician questioning 
why Allstate should pay the MRI bill when she could find "nothing in your 
records which identify clinical symptoms such as parathesias or radiculopathy 
C Page 5 
suggesting nerve impingement/7 See letter of Mcintosh attached to her 
deposition. 
7. The response was that Maxine Archuleta had complained of severe 
back pain from her neck to her tail bone on October 21,1993. By November 15, 
1993 the symptoms had mostly resolved except pain going down into her 
shoulders and persistent neck pain. Even though the objective observations 
showed the pain to be localized her physician was unable to observe any signs of 
acute disease he did not want to miss something if there was radicular pain. The 
negative MRI gave him a basis for encouraging Maxine Archuleta to resume her 
regular work load and continue physical therapy. "I felt the results aided me in 
encouraging her to get back to work at an earlier time and to continue with 
physical therapy/7 See letter of January 12,1994 attached to deposition of Sandra 
Mcintosh. 
8. Maxine Archuleta continued physical therapy only until the $3,000 
threshold was reached. Maxine Archuleta did not want to continue medical 
treatment. See Archuleta deposition pages 50 to 52. Maxine Archuleta has not 
been back to see any physician or therapist of any kind for her back problems 
since terminating physical therapy. See Archuleta deposition at page 55. 
9. Other than possibly missing 3 or 4 days immediately after the accident 
and occasionally leaving work early to make physical therapy appointments 
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Maxine Archuleta did not miss any work because of her accident See Archuleta 
deposition page 53. 
10. Maxine Archuleta refused to go to physical therapy or to receive any 
further treatment after her medical bills exceeded the $3,000 threshold. See 
Archuleta deposition pages 48 to 55. 
11. Maxine Archuleta does not claim to have any evidence that she was 
permanently injured in the car accident Her physician told her she suffered a 
strain and that was all. Archuleta deposition at pages 40 and 41. 
12. It was Hughes opinion that a fair settlement for the injury suffered by 
Maxine Archuleta would be in the $5,000 range. See Hughes affidavit and 
Hughes deposition page 104. 
13. Hughes engaged Ron Bennett, a licensed public adjuster to carry out 
the initial negotiations with Allstate Insurance. Hughes was aware of Bennett's 
skill as an accident investigator and his abilities in dealing with insurance 
personnel. Hughes was personally aware of the excellent job Bennett had done 
on other occasions for Hughes and for other attorneys including plaintiffs 
counsel, Dan Wilson. Hughes conveyed to Bennett his assessment of the case 
and instructions in how to proceed with the negotiations. The offer received 
from Allstate was higher than the value placed on the case by Hughes. 
C Page 7 
14. Hughes was of the opinion that the higher offer was due in part to 
Bennett's relationship with Allstate personnel and in part that Allstate did not 
know the lack of plaintiff's evidence demonstrating positive injury. 
15. The use of a skilled public adjuster or paralegal is consistent with the 
standard of practice in Weber County. Hughes had previously used Bennett in 
this manner and is aware of other attorneys engaging Bennett in the same 
function, including plaintiff's counsel, Dan Wilson. Hughes maintained 
responsible control over all aspects of the case and delivered a fair and 
reasonable result for Maxine Archuleta See affidavit of Hughes. 
16. The settlement received from Allstate as liability carrier consisted of 
$9,286 in new money and payment to the PIP carrier (Allstate) of $618 in 
subrogation rights. See draft attached to deposition of Maxine Archuleta and 
draft attached to deposition of Sandra Mcintosh. 
17. Maxine Archuleta was given a written accounting of the funds at the 
time she executed the release. See affidavit of Don Hughes. 
18. Maxine Archuleta had medical bills that did not relate in any way to 
the accident, including medical bills for her children. Maxine Archuleta 
requested that she receive $5,000 of the funds and that Hughes attempt to 
compromise the hospital bills for herself and her children with the balance of the 
funds. Maxine Archuleta was informed that she was responsible for her medical 
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bills and would have to pay any that were not compromised or exceeded the 
amount retained in trust 
19. In July of 1994 Maxine Archuleta asked Hughes to no longer try to 
resolve her medical bills and asked for the return of the funds being held in 
trust The funds were returned to her. See deposition of Hughes. 
20. Don Hughes graduated from the charter class of the J. Rueben Clark 
Law School at Brigham Young University. He was admitted to the Utah Bar in 
April of 1976. In the course of following years Hughes has represented 
hundreds of clients including many personal injury cases. Hughes is familiar 
with the standard of practice in Weber and Davis Counties through his nearly 
two decades of practice. 
21. A contingent fee agreement of 1/3 of any settlement, compromise or 
judgment is fair and comports with the standard of practice of attorneys in the 
second judicial district The retainer agreement between Hughes and Archuleta 
is fair and reasonable and comports with the standards of conduct generally 
prevailing in the second judicial district Defendant did not inflate his attorneys 
fee. 
22. Hughes represented Maxine Archuleta in a manner consistent with 
the standards of practice current in Weber and Davis Counties. Don Hughes 
achieved a fair and reasonable settlement for Maxine Archuleta. Maxine 
Archuleta received positive gain from the representation of Don Hughes and 
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suffered no damage. Maxine Archuleta was fairly and adequately compensated 
for her injuries. See affidavit of Don Hughes. 
POINT ONE 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CLAIM IS NOT MERITORIOUS 
Plaintiffs first claim is that $2,400 of additional medical bills should have 
been submitted to Allstate as the PIP carrier and no fee should have been 
charged. In addition to being wrong on the law there are no undisputed facts 
supporting plaintiffs claim. 
Plaintiff fails to establish the standard of care. The standard of care is a 
fact issue that must be established by expert opinion. The only expert opinion in 
the record is that of the defendant and that is to the effect that all of the acts of 
the defendant met the standard of care. 
Even if plaintiffs interpretation of the law were right it still does not 
establish a standard of care. The plaintiff cites an ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual 
for the proposition that contingent fees should not be collected on routine PIP 
filings. Even if this proposition were promulgated by unchallenged expert 
opinion it still does not establish the standard of care in this case. The burden is 
on the plaintiff to establish the standard of care by competent evidence. 
There is no proof this case represented routine PIP fillings. The evidence 
in the record is to the contrary. The insurance company was questioning PIP 
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filings and making demands of the physician for justification of why he was 
performing procedures when there was no physical evidence of their necessity. 
Plaintiff also fails to take into account that the negotiations proceeded 
rapidly to conclusion when Allstate as liability carrier offered settlement on the 
whole case. Plaintiff elected to take the settlement and attempt to reach a 
compromise with her medical providers. 
This claim is not ripe for summary judgment To prevail on summary 
judgment the plaintiff must 1) prove the standard of care by uncontroverted 
expert testimony; 2) The plaintiff must prove by uncontroverted evidence the 
defendant breached the standard of care; and 3) that damages were suffered by 
the plaintiff as the proximate cause of the breach. The plaintiff has failed on all 
counts. The plaintiff has not even asserted a prima facie case let alone an 
uncontested set of facts upon which the law can be applied. 
POINT TWO 
THERE WAS NO FRAUD CONSTRUCTIVE OF OTHERWISE 
It is good to see the plaintiff dropping the claim for actual fraud. It is 
good to see the acknowledgment that there is no evidence of misrepresentation. 
Plaintiff has been forced to rely on "constructive fraud/' Plaintiff acknowledges 
that there is no evidence that the defendant misrepresented anything to her or 
concealed anything from her. 
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Plaintiffs counsel sets out the basis of the "constructive" fraud claim in 
the first paragraph of his point ZA. on page 16 of his memorandum, 
"Plaintiff has alleged fraud based on the fact that Defendant 
Hughes inflated his attorney fee by $800 by settling her personally 
[sic] claim to include $2,400 of medical expenses that should have 
simply been submitted to her PIP carrier, This was a violation of 
Hughes' duty, when explaining the basis for his contingency fee, 
to disclose to the plaintiff the availability of PIP insurance that 
would automatically pay the medical bills; and to disclose the lack 
of risk in collecting those benefits." (emphasis added) 
There are two problems with plaintiffs fraud claim. First, plaintiffs 
counsel is wrong on the law. See defendant's reply brief in support of his 
motion to dismiss plaintiffs fraud claim for a listing of cases and arguments. 
There is no evidence of any misrepresentation or omission. Secondly, plaintiff 
has failed to assert let alone prove by uncontested facts the necessary elements of 
fraud. 
"Constructive" fraud is an equitable matter. Its availability is defined in 
37 Am Jur 2d § 4. "Where an action is one at law for damages, and not in equity, 
proof of actual fraud is ordinarily required. On the other hand, courts of equity 
may grant relief on the ground of constructive fraud such as would not 
authorize relief by way of an action of deceit at law." Plaintiff has chosen to file 
a suit at law for damages and does not seek equitable remedies. "Constructive" 
fraud is not available to her in this case. 
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But even if it were plaintiff has failed to assert and prove by uncontested 
facts a claim for relief. Each of the emphasized portions of the quote from 
plaintiffs memorandum is an assertion of a standard of care or an asserted duty. 
Plaintiffs counsel asserts Hughes inflated his attorney's fee $800. This is denied. 
He asserts the bills should have been submitted to the PIP carrier. This shows a 
lack of understanding of the facts of the case and also asserts a duty that has not 
been established by plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts a breach of a duty to disclose the 
availability of PIP insurance. This duty is asserted without expert testimony and 
also ignores the fact that plaintiff was already submitting her own PIP claims 
before she retained defendant. Plaintiff also asserts there was a duty to disclose 
a lack of risk in collecting PIP benefits. This duty is asserted without expert 
opinion in the record. It also ignores the facts of this case. The plaintiff received 
$618 of PIP benefits before the adjuster began questioning treatments when there 
was no supporting clinical evidence for the treatments. 
"Constructive" fraud is sometimes applied to the realm of fiduciaries and 
others that owe duties. In this case plaintiff has failed to produce expert 
testimony that establishes any duty. The only evidence in the record on the 
matter is the affidavit and deposition of the defendant 
This claim is not ripe for summary judgment. The plaintiff fails to state a 
prima facie claim for fraud let alone a claim based on uncontested facts. Plaintiff 
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has failed to 1) establish the duty of care; 2) prove a breach of the standard of 
care or; 3) to show any damages proximately flowing from any breach. 
The only expert testimony in the record establishing a standard of care is 
that of the defendant 
POINT THREE 
NO CLAIM FOR MALPRACTICE HAS BEEN PROVEN 
Plaintiffs third claim is "that as a matter of law, defendant's legal 
representation fell short of the required standard of care for clients representing 
clients in personal injury actions/' The same analysis as previously stated 
applies to this claim as well. 
The general rule is that negligence cases are not subject to summary 
judgment Preston v Lamb 436 P2d 1021 (Utah 1968). This applies to attorney 
negligence as well. Jackson, supra. The standard of care and question of breach 
are fact questions for the jury on receipt of proper expert opinion. Jackson, supra; 
Brown, supra. The plaintiff has failed to show any damages proximately flowing 
from anv claimed breach. 
CONCLUSION 
This case is not one that is ripe for summary judgment. The issues of 
fraud and punitive damages should be disposed of by defendant's motion to 
dismiss and plaintiffs claim of malpractice should proceed to trial. Plaintiffs 
motion for partial summary judgment should be denied. 
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Dated this 12th day of November, 1995 
Donald Hughes 
CERHFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
memorandum and accompanying memorandum to the following this day of 
November, 1995 to the following: 
Dan Wilson 
290 25th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Donald Hughes 
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Donald Hughes 
PO Box 27611 
St. Louis, MO 63146 
Telephone: (314) 968-8055 
Fax:(314)968-8055 
Attorney, Pro Se 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS 






AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 940700264 
Judge Dawson 
BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, Don Hughes deposes and says as follows: 
1. Hughes was contacted by phone in St. Louis, Missouri by Maxine 
Archuleta on or about October 19,1993 requesting that he represent her in a 
potential claim for injuries suffered in an automobile accident Ron Bennett and 
the plaintiff were on the phone when defendant answered. 
2. Before contacting Hughes, Maxine Archuleta claims to have been 
referred to Ron Bennett, a licensed public adjuster by her friend Vsana Skinner. 
She claims, " ...Vsana skinner referred me~you know, she contacted Ron about 
the accident I was in. Irene knows Ron. Q. Thaf s Irene Roche? A. Yes, and —" 
Archuleta deposition at page 65. Plaintiff sought out Don Hughes to retain him. 
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3. Maxine Archuleta executed the retainer agreement attached hereto as 
Exhibit A on October 23,1993 in the presence of Ron Bennett 
4. Maxine Archuleta's initial medical bills totaling $618 were submitted 
to Allstate Insurance as PIP carrier. Allstate paid these initial bills. See drafts 
attached to the deposition of Sandra Mcintosh. Maxine Archuleta handled the 
routine submission of these bills herself. See application for PIP benefits 
attached to deposition of Sandra Mcintosh. No attorney's fee was taken by 
Hughes on any of these routinely submitted bills. 
5. On November 17,1993 Maxine Archuleta had an MRI. The results 
were: "Discs appear essentially unremarkable at all levels. There may be a 
minuscule annular bulge at C3-4 but no evidence of herniation extruded 
fragment or foraminal compromise. Cord intrinsically normal without evidence 
of mass, syninx, etc. No evidence of congenital or acquired spinal stenosis. 
IMPRESSION: ESSENTIALLY NORMAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE SCAN, 
CERVICAL SPINE WITH ABOVE OBSERVATIONS/' See letter attached to 
deposition of Sandra Mcintosh. 
6. On January 7,1994 Sandra Mcintosh as claim representative of Allstate 
Insurance PIP benefits sent a letter to Maxine Archuleta's physician questioning 
why Allstate should pay the MRI bill when she could find "nothing in your 
records which identify clinical symptoms such as parathesias or radiculopathy 
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suggesting nerve impingement/ ' See letter attached to deposition of Sandra 
Mcintosh. 
7. The response was that Maxine Archuleta had complained of severe 
back pain from her neck to her tail bone on October 21,1993. By November 15, 
1993 the symptoms had mostly resolved except pain going down into her 
shoulders and persistent neck pain. Even though the objective observations 
showed the pain to be localized her physician was unable to observe any signs of 
acute disease he did not want to miss something if there was radicular pain. The 
negative MRI gave him a basis for encouraging Maxine Archuleta to resume her 
regular work load and continue physical therapy. "I felt the results aided me in 
encouraging her to get back to work at an earlier time and to continue with 
physical therapy/' See letter of January 12,1994 attached to deposition of Sandra 
Mcintosh. 
8. Maxine Archuleta continued physical therapy only until the $3,000 
threshold was reached. Maxine Archuleta did not want to continue medical 
treatment. See Archuleta deposition pages 50 to 52. Maxine Archuleta has not 
been back to see any physician or therapist of any kind for her back problems 
since terminating physical therapy. See Archuleta deposition at page 55. 
9. Other than possibly missing 3 or 4 days immediately after the accident 
and occasionally leaving work early to make physical therapy appointments 
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Maxine Archuleta did not miss any work because of her accident. See Archuleta 
deposition page 53. 
10. Maxine Archuleta refused to go to physical therapy or to receive any 
further treatment after her medical bills exceeded the $3,000 threshold. See 
Archuleta deposition pages 48 to 55. 
11. Maxine Archuleta does not claim to have anv evidence that she was 
permanently injured in the car accident Her physician told her she suffered a 
strain and that was all. Archuleta deposition at pages 40 and 41. 
12. It was Hughes opinion that a fair settlement for the injury suffered by 
Maxine Archuleta would be in the $5,000 range. 
13. Hughes engaged Ron Bennett, a licensed public adjuster to carry out 
the initial negotiations with Allstate Insurance. Hughes was aware of Bennett's 
skill as an accident investigator and his abilities in dealing with insurance 
personnel. Hughes was personally aware of the excellent job Bennett had done 
on other occasions for Hughes and for other attorneys including plaintiffs 
counsel, Dan Wilson. Hughes conveyed to Bennett his assessment of the case 
and instructions in how to proceed with the negotiations. The offer received 
from Allstate was higher than the value placed on the case by Hughes. 
14. Hughes was of the opinion that the higher offer was due in part to 
Bennett's relationship with Allstate personnel and in part that Allstate did not 
know the lack of plaintiffs evidence demonstrating positive injury. 
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15. The use of a skilled public adjuster or paralegal is consistent with the 
standard of practice in Weber County. Hughes had previously used Bennett in 
this manner and is aware of other attorneys engaging Bennett in the same 
function, including plaintiffs counsel, Dan Wilson. Hughes maintained 
responsible control over all aspects of the case and delivered a fair and 
reasonable result for Maxine Archuleta See affidavit of Hughes. 
16. The settlement received from Allstate as liability carrier consisted of 
$9,286 in new money and payment to the PIP carrier (Allstate) of $618 in 
subrogation rights. See draft attached to deposition of Maxine Archuleta and 
draft attached to deposition of Sandra Mcintosh. 
17. Maxine Archuleta was given a written accounting of the funds at the 
time she executed the release. 
18. Maxine Archuleta had medical bills that did not relate in any way to 
the accident, including medical bills for her children. Maxine Archuleta 
requested that she receive $5,000 of the funds and that Hughes attempt to 
compromise the hospital bills for herself and her children with the balance of the 
funds. Maxine Archuleta was informed that she was responsible for her medical 
bills and would have to pay any that were not compromised or exceeded the 
amount retained in trust. 
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19. In July of 1994 Maxine Archuleta asked Hughes to no longer 
represent her and asked for the return of the funds being held in trust. The 
funds were returned to her. 
20. Don Hughes graduated from the charter class of the J. Rueben Clark 
Law School at Brigham Young University. He was admitted to the Utah Bar in 
April of 1976. In the course of following years Hughes has represented 
hundreds of clients including many personal injury cases. Hughes is familiar 
with the standards of practice in Weber and Davis Counties through his nearly 
two decades of practice. Hughes is familiar with the standards of practice as 
relates to cases similar to the accident of plaintiff. 
21. A contingent fee agreement of 1/3 of any settlement, compromise or 
judgment is fair and comports with the standard of practice of attorneys in the 
second judicial district. The retainer agreement between Hughes and Archuleta 
is fair and reasonable and comports with the standards of conduct generally 
prevailing in the second judicial district Defendant did not inflate his attorneys 
fee. 
22. Hughes represented Maxine Archuleta in a manner consistent with 
the standards of practice current in Weber and Davis Counties. Don Hughes 
achieved a fair and reasonable settlement for Maxine Archuleta. Maxine 
Archuleta received positive gain from the representation of Don Hughes and 
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suffered no damage. Maxine Archuleta was fairly and adequately compensated 
for her injuries. 
23. Hughes did not make any misrepresentations to plaintiff, nor did he 
omit any material facts. All disclosures required by the standard of care were 
made. Hughes fulfilled both his contractual responsibilities to plaintiff as well 
as his responsibilities as her attorney. 
24. The statements contained herein are true and correct to the best of my 
knowledge. Those things of which I do not have direct knowledge I believe to 
be true upon information and belief. The source of information of matters not 
directly experienced by me includes the pleadings and discovery performed in 
this case and in trial preparation. Significant sources are often cited where 
applicable. 
Dated this f /day of November, 1995. 
Donald Hughes 
Subscribed and sworn before me this l*f day of November, 1995 
BETTY J. LEBO YD 1 
Notary Public - Notary SssJ 
STATE OF MISSOURI 
St Louis Counw 
_fo Coiamiwion Expires y*\-. -^%if^ 
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Daniel L. Wilson, #4257 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
290-25th Street, Suite 204 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-6119 
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DONALD C. HUGHES 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
PORTIONS OF DEFENDANT'S 
AFFIDAVIT OF NOVEMBER 14, 1995 
SUBMITTED IN OPPOSITION TO 




Plaintiff hereby moves to strike portions of defendants 
Affidavit for the reasons set forth below. 
Pursuant to Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Affidavit's in Support of or Opposing a Motion for Summary 
Judgement, " . . .shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the 
matters stated therein." URCP 56 (e) and G.N.S. Partnership v. 
Fullmer, 873 P2d 1157. Furthermore, " [I]nadmissible evidence 
cannot be considered in ruling on a Motion for Summary Judgement," 
D and L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989) . An 
Affidavit which does not meet the requirements of Rule 5 6 (e) is 
subject to a Motion to Strike. Howick v. Bank of Salt Lake, 28 
Utah 2d 64, 65, 498 P2d 352, 353-354 (1972). The following 
paragraphs of Defendant's Affidavit must be stricken for the 
reasons set forth below: 
(A copy of Hughes' Affidavit is attached for the convenience 
of the Court,) 
1. Paragraph two contains legal arguments based on the 
deposition of the plaintiff- That is legal argument based on 
someone else's testimony. The final sentence of that paragraph 
states, "Plaintiff sought out Don Hughes to retain him." Clearly 
the defendant does not know what was in the plaintiff's mind. He 
cannot testify about her motives or intent. There is nothing in 
paragraph 2 that is based on the personal knowledge of the 
defendant. This entire paragraph must be stricken from Defendant's 
Affidavit. 
2. Paragraph three of Defendant's Affidavit states, "Maxcine 
Archuleta executed the Retainer Agreement attached hereto as 
Exhibit A on October 23, 1993 in the presence of Ron Bennett." 
Defendant does not claim to have been present at the time this 
Retainer Agreement was executed. At his own deposition, defendant 
admitted he was not present when Archuleta signed the Attorney 
Retainer Agreement. (Hughes deposition, page 38.) Since he was 
not present, the defendant can have no personal knowledge 
concerning the alleged fact. While the fact itself may be true, 
nonetheless, it is not a fact upon which the defendant can testify. 
Therefore, paragraph three of his Affidavit must be stricken. 
3. Paragraph four contains six sentences. Each of the first 
five sentences must be stricken. The first three of these 
sentences state facts which are not within defendant's personal 
knowledge. The fourth and fifth sentences are based on an unsworn 
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document attached as an exhibit to a deposition. But neither this 
witness nor any other testified that they had any personal 
knowledge about whether or not the form in question had been filled 
out by Maxcine Archuleta personally or who may have provided 
assistance in filling out that form. Therefore, sentences four and 
five are not based on the personal knowledge of the defendant and 
are not supported by any sworn testimony of any witness. Clearly 
both must be stricken from this Affidavit. The only sentence 
within paragraph four that can survive this Motion to Strike is the 
final sentence that states that "no attorney fees were taken by 
Hughes on any of the routinely submitted bills." That information 
is within his personal knowledge and is properly established by 
Affidavit for purposes of this Motion. 
4. None of the information contained in paragraphs five, and 
seven are within^ersonal knowledge of the defendant. All are 
based on unsworn documents. 
5. All of the information contained in paragraphs eight, 
nine, ten and eleven of Defendant/s Affidavit consist exclusively 
of arguments based upon the Affidavit of the plaintiff. Nothing in 
paragraphs eight, nine, ten or eleven of Defendant's Affidavit is 
based on his personal knowledge nor does defendant affirmatively 
show that he is competent to testify as to the matters stated 
therein. Therefore, all of paragraphs eight, nine, ten and eleven 
must be stricken. 
6. Paragraph 17 must be stricken because it states a 
purported fact that is not within the defendant's personal 
knowledge. He admitted at deposition that he wasn't present when 
that event supposedly occurred. He cant testify to it if he wasn't 
even there. 
Date Daniel L. Wilson 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Mailed to: Donald C. Hughes 
P.O. Box 27611 
St. Louis, MO 63146 
Date signature 
^Jj^iUiM^ 
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Asdg*1* Comtwy Copy 
t for Hearing 
Daniel L. Wilson, #4257 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
290-25th Street, Suite 204 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-6119 
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DONALD C. HUGHES 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY IN SUPPORT 




OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT'S PURPORTED STATEMENTS OF FACT 
Several of defendant's purported Statements of Fact must be 
stricken for failure to comply with Rule 4-501(2) (b) of the Code of 
Judicial Administration which requires that all such purported 
statements to be properly supported by an accurate reference to the 
record, and furthermore because of Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure which requires that all facts relied upon in 
Support of or in Opposition to a Motion for Summary Judgement be 
based on personal knowledge. This latter requirement also places 
upon the affiant the duty to affirmatively show that he is 
competent to testify as to the matters stated therein. See, URCP 
56(e) and G.N.S. Partnership v. Fullmer, 873 P2d 1157. 
The following portions of Defendant's Purported Statements of 
Fact must be stricken: 
1. Paragraph two of Defendant's Purported Statements of Fact 
must be stricken for two reasons. All but the last sentence fails 
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to accurately refer to the record as required by Rule 4-501(2) (b) 
of the Code of Judicial Administration because it contains an 
incomplete quote. Defendant has conveniently omitted lines 22 and 
23 of page 65 of the plaintiffs deposition wherein she was asked: 
Q: Did you speak with Ron [Bennett] over the phone ever? 
A: He called me. 
It is fundamentally unfair and dishonest to try to prove a 
point by including only portions of a quotation but fail to include 
the part of the quotation that specifically addresses the fact in 
controversy. The answer to that specific question unequivocally 
contradicts defendant's assertion. 
Moreover, the last sentence of Defendant's Purported Statement 
of Fact number two - "Plaintiff sought out Don Hughes to retain 
him" - is totally unsupported by the record. In fact, it is 
directly contrary to the record evidence. Defendant has no 
personal knowledge of this fact and no other witness has testified 
that way. Consequently, all of defendant's purported statement of 
fact number two must be stricken. 
2. Defendant's Purported Statement of Fact number three must 
be stricken because it is unsupported by references to the record. 
An identical paragraph in Defendant's Affidavit is the subject of 
a separate Motion to Strike for the reason that it concerns matters 
not within the personal knowledge of the defendant. 
3. Defendant's purported statement of fact number four must 
be stricken because of inadequate references to the record and 
because it is based on unsworn testimony. Specifically, the 
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statement "that Maxcine Archuleta handled the routine submission of 
these bills herself" is unsupported by references to the record. 
There was no testimony during the deposition of any witness as to 
whether or not Maxcine Archuleta handled the submission of these 
bills herself or whether someone else did it or whether she 
received the assistance of defendant's agent. 
No objection is made to the portion of defendant's purported 
fact number four that states that, "no attorney's fee was taken by 
Hughes on any of the routinely submitted bills. 
4. All of Defendant's Purported Statement of Fact numbers 
five and seven must be stricken because they are based on unsworn 
documents. The documents were attached as exhibits to the 
deposition of Sandra Macintosh but neither she nor any other 
witness has given any testimony as to the creation of the 
documents nor the source of the information contained therein. 
Therefore, all of the information contained in Defendant's 
Purported Statements of Fact numbers five and seven are based on 
heresy and must "be stricken. 
^L Defendant's purported fact number 17 must be stricken for 
failure to specifically refer to the portion of the record upon 
which the statement is based. Defendant cites his own Affidavit, 
but in that Affidavit, he does not claim to have personal knowledge 
that the fact is true. Instead, at page 3 8 of his deposition, he 
admitted that he was not present when this event allegedly 
occurred. Therefore, he cannot testify concerning this fact since 
he has no personal knowledge about it. 
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ARGUMENT 
1. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGEMENT FOR $800. 
It appears that defendant opposes plaintiff's claim for refund 
of the $800 attorney fee on the grounds that plaintiff has failed 
to show negligence. At page 11 of his Opposing Memorandum, 
defendant states the proposition that for plaintiff to prevail on 
her motion for Summary Judgement, she must prove a standard of care 
by expert testimony and that this standard of care was breached. 
Defendant misses the point of plaintiff's argument. Plaintiff is 
entitled to summary judgement with respect to the $800 not because 
of malpractice or negligence, but instead because of reasons that 
are based purely on contract law which do not depend on any issues 
of fact. The attorney retainer agreement is a contract in writing. 
Therefore, its terms are construed as a matter of law and do no 
present a jury question. As a matter of law, the contract simply 
does not authorize a fee for recovering PIP benefits. Plaintiff 
need not rely on any arguments concerning the standard of care or 
other negligence arguments. She is entitled to the refund of the 
$800 based on the contract itself which does not provide for any 
such fee. 
Even if the contract did provide for fee (which it doesn't) 
those [missing] terms would be unenforceable because such an 
agreement is prohibited by law. However this Court need not reach 
that issue because of the simple fact that contract does not 
provide for a fee in the facts and circumstances of this case. 
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PLAINTIFF IS ALSO ENTITLED TO A FULL 
REFUND OF THE BALANCE OF THE ATTORNEY FEES OF 52,295 
More importantly, plaintiff must be granted Summary Judgement 
against defendant for a refund of the entire attorney fee charged 
in this case because the attorney retainer agreement didn't provide 
for any attorney fee in the facts of this case. Defendant's 
failure to address the issue in his memorandum is a clear 
indication that defendant has no grounds upon which to claim a 
right to his fee in this case. 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY 
JUDGEMENT ON HER CLAIM OF CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD 
Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgement on her theory of constructive fraud is based on two 
grounds. First of all, he claims that constructive fraud is an 
"equitable" claim and that since plaintiff has chosen to file a 
suit at law for damages and has not sought equitable remedies that 
constructive fraud is not available to her. (Page 12 of 
Defendant's Opposing Memorandum.) And on the further grounds that 
plaintiff has failed to produce expert testimony that establishes 
any duty [of defendant to act as a fiduciary] . (Page 13 of 
Defendant's Opposing Memorandum.) 
Defendant is wrong on both points. The elements of 
constructive fraud are as follows: 
1. A confidential relationship (Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P2d 
766 at 769 (Utah 1985), quoting Blodaett v. Martsch, 590 P2d 298, 
302 (Utah 1978). 
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2 . A transaction that has benefitted the superior party in 
a confidential relationship Von Hake, supra, at 769. 
3 . Actual damages. 
The undisputed facts of this case establish all three elements 
of constructive fraud. While the question of whether a 
relationship is confidential is generally a question of fact, it is 
not always so, the attorney client relationship is one of the very 
few relationships that is defined as being presumptively 
confidential. Blodcrett, supra at 3 02; Von Hake, supra at 77 0; and, 
In re; Swan's estate, 4 Utah 2d at 281, 283 P2d at 684. There is 
no requirement in this case that the plaintiff present evidence 
that a confidential relationship existed because it is undisputed 
that the defendant represented plaintiff as an attorney in a 
personal injury case. (Undisputed fact number two of Plaintiff 
Main Memorandum and Hughes' deposition at page 23, lines 17-19. 
Such a relationship is defined by law as confidential. Therefore, 
there are no fact issues to be resolved with respect to whether or 
not a confidential relationship existed between plaintiff and 
defendant. 
Nor is there a dispute as to whether there was a transaction 
that benefitted the superior party in this confidential 
relationship. Both plaintiff and defendant agree that defendant 
charged a one-third contingent fee of $800 for collecting $2,400 of 
medical expenses incurred by plaintiff as a result of her injury 
(Undisputed fact number 11 of plaintiff's main brief) . Both 
parties also agree that the $2,400 of medical expenses were never 
F - « -
submitted to plaintiff's PIP insurer- (Undisputed fact number 12 
of plaintiff's main brief) . And furthermore, that if the bills had 
been submitted to plaintiff's insurance carrier, they would have 
been paid under the PIP policy. (Undisputed fact number 13 of 
plaintiff's main brief.) Those are the undisputed facts of this 
case. Based on those facts, there can be no result other than to 
conclude as a matter of law that this constituted a transaction 
that benefitted Hughes by $800. Nor can there be any other 
conclusion than that the attorney is the superior party in the 
confidential relationship created when an attorney represents a 
client. Based on these undisputed facts, the law further provides 
that such a transaction is presumed to have been unfair and to have 
resulted from undue influence and fraud. Von Hake, supra at 767. 
Based on these undisputed showings, the burden of proof has 
shifted. The benefitting party, the defendant in this case, bears 
the burden of persuading the fact finder by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the transaction was in fact fair and not the result 
of fraud or undue influence. Von Hake, supra at 769. Because the 
defendant in this case has failed to make any showing sufficient to 
establish that collecting $800 on PIP benefits was in fact fair and 
not the result of fraud or undue influence, he has failed to meet 
the burden of proof that would be his at trial. Since he has 
failed to carry the burden at this level, Summary Judgement must be 
entered against him. Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 US 317, 322 
(1986). This is the law followed by the Utah Court of Appeals in 
Reeves v. Geicrv Pharmaceutical Inc./ 7 64 P2d 63 6, 642 (Utah App. 
r - 7 -
1988) . As a matter of law, since the defendant bears the burden of 
proof at trial he cannot sit back and merely claim to have evidence 
that he will present at trial. That's not how the law of Summary 
Judgement works in Utah. He has an affirmative duty to come 
forward with admissible evidence at the Motion for Summary 
Judgement because the burden of proof is his. 
It's extremely doubtful that he could ever meet that burden of 
proof by the required preponderance of evidence but it makes no 
difference now whether he could or could not. This is a Motion for 
Summary Judgement. He has the burden of proof. He has set forth 
no facts to show, "... that the transaction was in fact fair and not 
the result of fraud or undue influence." Von Hake, supra, at 7 69. 
Therefore, while the defendant could possibly have had a trial on 
the issue by submitting an Affidavit that properly addressed these 
issues, he has failed to do so and thus cannot survive this Motion 
for Summary Judgement. Geiqy, supra. 
Finally, the requirement of actual damages is clearly been met 
in the amount of $800. 
While a trial will be required on the issue of punitive 
damages, that is the only remaining issue with respect to 
plaintiff's claim of fraud 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY 
JUDGEMENT THAT DEFENDANT COMMITTED MALPRACTICE 
Summary Judgement on the issue of malpractice is mandated 
because fraud, having already been established, is per se 
malpractice. However a trial will be required on the issue of 
damages 
Date Daniel L. Wilson 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Mailed to: Donald C. Hughes 
P.O. Box 27611 
St. Louis, MO 63146 
II-/H6 MftCWPltOOvf "") 
Date Signature 
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Daniel L. Wilson, #4257 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
290-25th Street, Suite 204 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-6119 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




DONALD C. HUGHES 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 
RE: CONSTRUCTION OF 
ATTORNEY FEE AGREEMENT 
Civil No.940700264 
Judge Dawson 
Pursuant to the Court's request to provide additional 
citations to cases that have addressed the issue of how to construe 
written Attorney retainer agreements, the Plaintiff submits the 
following: 
First of all, Plaintiff notes that the interpretation of a 
written contract is usually a matter of law. Overson v. United 
States Fidelity and Guaranty, 587 P2d 149 (Utah 1978) . (Copy 
attached) Furthermore, whether or not a contract is ambiguous is 
also a matter of law, 17A Am Jur 2d, Contracts § 339 and cases 
cited therein. 
Where an ambiguity is found to exist in a contract, the 
resolution of that ambiguity is still a question of law for the 
Court, unless contradictory evidence is presented to clarify the 
ambiguity. Overson, supra. However, there is a major exception to 
that general principal in those cases where a party to the contract 
was both the Attorney draftsman of and a party to the instrument. 
Gr1 
In all such cases, proper construction of such an instrument is 
strictly against the Attorney draftsman who is also a party to the 
instrument. Continental Bank and Trust Company v. Bybee, 3 06 P2d 
773 (Utah 1957) . (Copy attached) . While that is an older case, 
it's application was reinforced by the Utah Supreme Court as 
recently as 1989 in the case of Phillips v. Smith, 768 P2d 449 
(Utah 19 89) at Page 451 of that decision, (copy attached) , the 
Court quoted Continental Bank and Trust Company v. Bybee, supra, 
and noted that the rule is even reinforced when the instrument at 
issue relates to an Attorney-Client contingent fee arrangement such 
as that that is presented in this case. Phillips, supra at 451. 
At the hearing on this matter, Defendant urged the Court to 
construe an ambiguity in the contract in his favor. While it's 
possible the Supreme might reverse it's holding in Continental Bank 
and Trust Company and in Phillips, there is no other case in Utah 
that suggests that the Court is unhappy with the rule of law set 
forth therein. Therefore, those decisions appear to be binding on 
this Court and if the Court finds the contract presents an 
ambiguity, that ambiguity must be resolved against Defendant rather 
than in his favor. 
Plaintiff notes that the effect of this decision is not as 
prejudicial as it may appear because the Supreme Court in Phillips 
also recognized and reinforced the principle that even if a 
contingent fee agreement is rendered void, the Attorney is still 
entitled to seek fees on the basis of quantum meruit. Phillips, 
supra at 452, footnote 5. 
Gr*. 
Date Daniel L. Wilson 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Mailed to: Donald C. Hughes 
P.O. Box 27611 
St. Louis, MO 63146 
VIA FAX TRANSMISSION: (314)968-8055 
Date Signature 
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OVERSON v. UNITED STATES 
Cite as 5* 
Plaintiff incurred attorney's fees of $14,-
920, which included $2,500 for an attorney 
she had previously retained. Plaintiff was 
compelled to engage in extensive discovery, 
particularly in regard to the assets and 
defendant's ownership thereof, which in 
several instances he claimed were owned by 
others. There is no basis in the record after 
reviewing the circumstances to deem the 
fractional award of attorney's fees to plain-
tiff as an abuse of discretion. 
ELLETT, C. J., and CROCKETT, WIL-
KINS and HALL, JJ.f concur. 
PER CURIAM: 
Pursuant to respondent's petition for 
rehearing in this case, the Court makes the 
following addendum to the decision here-
tofore rendered: The case is remanded 
to the district court to determine whether 
considerations of equity and justice require 
the making of a further award to plaintiff 
of attorney's fees incurred because of this 
appeal; and if so, the amount.1 With such 
amendment the petition is denied. 
Kirt OVERSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND 
GUARANTY COMPANY, a/k/a USF & 
G, an insurance company, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 15470. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 14, 1978. 
Insured brought declaratory judgment 
action against insurer to determine effect 
of coverage provisions of a general liability 
policy designed to protect against losses oc-
curring in construction project. The Fifth 
District Court, Millard County, Harlan 
Burns, J., directed a verdict in favor of 
1. Eastman v. Easti 
IDELITY AND GUARANTY Utah 149 
P.2d 149 
insurer and dismissed action with prejudice 
and insured appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Hall, J., held that where the policy express-
ly and unambiguously excluded coverage 
for property damage to "property in the 
care, custody or control of the insured or as 
to which the insured is for any purpose 
exercising physical control" and "damage to 
work performed by or on behalf of named 
insured arising out of due work or any 
portion thereof, or out of materials, parts or 
equipment furnished in connection there-
with," insured was not entitled to coverage 
for destruction by fire of building under 
construction by the insured, a subcontrac-
tor, arising out of work done by the in-
sured's employees and materials supplied by 
the insured. 
Affirmed. 
1. Contracts c=»176(1) 
Interpretation of a contract's language 
is usually a matter of law. 
2. Insurance e=>435.24(7) 
Where general liability insurance policy 
expressly and unambiguously excluded cov-
erage for property damage to "property in 
the care, custody or control of the insured 
or as to which the insured is for any pur-
pose exercising physical control" and "dam-
age to work performed by or on behalf of 
the Named Insured arising out of due work 
or any portion thereof, or out of materials, 
parts or equipment furnished in connection 
therewith," insured was not entitled to cov-
erage for destruction by fire of building 
under construction by the insured, a subcon-
tractor, arising out of work done by the 
insured's employees and materials supplied 
by the insured. 
Philip R. Fishier, of Strong & Hanni, Salt 
Lake City, and LeKay G. Jackson, of Jack-
son & Jackson, Delta, for plaintiff and ap-
pellant. 
George A. Hunt, of Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau, Salt Lake City, for defendant 
and respondent. 
n, Utah, 55S P 2d 514. 
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HALL, Justice: 
This is a declaratory judgment action 
filed by plaintiff ("Overson") against de-
fendant insurer ("USF & G") to determine 
the effect of coverage provisions of an in-
surance policy. 
Overson was insured under a general lia-
bility policy issued by USF & G designed to 
protect against losses that might occur in 
construction projects. The policy excluded 
certain types of loss from coverage includ-
ing the following clauses which are the 
focus of this appeal: 
This insurance does not apply: 
* * * * * * 
(k) to property damage to 
* * * * * * 
(3) property in the care, custody or 
control of the insured or as to which the 
insured is for any purpose exercising 
physical control; 
* * * * * * 
(o) to property damage to work per-
formed by or on behalf of the Named 
Insured arising out of the work or any 
portion thereof, or out of materials, parts 
or equipment furnished in connection 
therewith; 
* * * * * * 
Overson had sub-contracted to construct 
two quonset-type metal buildings to be used 
for potato storage. Other sub-contractors 
were engaged to furnish the steel, footings, 
foundations and electrical work, to pour 
concrete, to provide certain carpentry work, 
and the like. When almost completed, one 
of the buildings was totally destroyed by 
fire. The general contractor had directed 
Overson to enlarge two louvred ventilation 
panels. When Overson's employees encoun-
tered difficulty in removing one of the pan-
els, an acetylene torch was used in an at-
tempt to cut the head off a stripped bolt. 
The flame from the torch suddenly ignited 
the foam insulation and the building was 
totally destroyed within minutes. The em-
ployees of Overson were the only people in 
and around the building at the time of the 
incident. 
1. 48 Tenn.App. 419, 348 S.W.2d 512 (1961). 
See also Madden v. Vita milk Dairy, /nc, 59 
Overson sued USF & G to determine 
whether the fire loss was covered by the 
policy. USF & G's motion for summary 
judgment was denied and the matter was 
tried to a jury. After plaintiffs case, the 
trial court directed a verdict and dismissed 
the action with prejudice, deciding that, as 
a matter of law, the policy did not cover the 
fire loss due to the clear, unambiguous lan-
guage of the policy exclusions. Overson 
appeals, asserting that (1) the policy was 
ambiguous; and (2) there was a jury ques-
tion as to who had "care, custody or con-
trol." 
Overson cites a number of cases which 
interpret language similar to that contained 
in clause (k) as being ambiguous. However, 
each case cited addresses close factual ques-
tions, not present here, as to whether or not 
the property was actually in the insured's 
care, custody or control at the time of the 
accident. In the instant case it appears 
that the facts are clear (i. e., Overson's 
control) and the exclusionary language of 
the policy is clear, such that the former is 
included within and subject to the latter. 
Language such as was used in the policy 
here generally has been said to be clear and 
unambiguous. This is reflected in Hill v. 
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.,1 
wherein the court stated: 
We think the exclusion clause of the 
policy which provides that said policy 
does not offer indemnity for damage to 
"Property in the care, custody or control 
of the insured or property as to which the 
insured for any purpose is exercising con-
trol," is clear and unambiguous and, as 
has been stated in many cases, the Courts 
will not create an ambiguity where none 
exists. 
Likewise, there is no factual dispute as to 
clause (o) in the matter before us. The 
damage in question was property damage 
to work performed by the insured (erecting 
and insulating building) which arose out of 
work done by the insured employees (cut-
ting bolt and removing louvres) and materi-
als supplied by the insured (foam insula-
tion). 
Wash.2d 237, 367 P.2d 127 (1961), and 62 A.L. 
R.2d 1242. 
Gr5 
BEKINS BAR V RANCH v. UTAH FARM PRODUCTION 
Cite as 587 P.2d 151 
[1] All of these facts being undisputed, Salt Lake County, David B 
Utah 151 
there is no genuine issue of fact to be 
resolved. The accepted principle is that the 
interpretation of a contract's language is 
usually a law matter.2 This principle was 
articulated in the case of Central Credit 
Collection Control Corp. v. Grayson* as fol-
lows: 
Interpretation of a written contract is 
usually a question of law for the court. 
If its terms are clear and unambiguous, 
summary judgment is proper. Even 
where some ambiguity exists in the con-
tract, resolution of the ambiguity is still a 
question of law for the court, unless con-
tradictory evidence is presented to clarify 
the ambiguity. 
[2] Therefore, because there is no dis-
pute as to material fact the court could 
properly have granted USF & G's motion 
for summary judgment. That such prelimi-
nary motion was denied does not show the 
existence of a fact issue which would pre-
clude a subsequent directed verdict.4 
The judgment is affirmed with costs on 
appeal to USF & G. 
ELLETT, C. J., and CROCKETT, MAU-
GHAN and WILKINS, JJ., concur. 
BEKINS BAR V RANCH, a Utah Corpo-
ration, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
UTAH FARM PRODUCTION CREDIT 
ASSOCIATION, Defendant and 
Respondent. 
No. 15563. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 14, 1978. 
Dee, J., in 
response to motion to dismiss which was 
filed before answer and supported by affi-
davits and other materials outside the 
pleadings and which trial court treated as 
one for summary judgment. The Supreme 
Court, Wilkins, J., held that dismissal on 
merits after treating defendant's motion to 
dismiss as one for summary judgment was 
improper, where motion to dismiss was not 
specifically denominated as Rule 12(b) mo-
tion, nor did it expressly state that motion 
was based upon failure to state claim upon 
which reason could be granted under 
12(b)(6), and no notice was given to plain-
tiff in advance of memorandum decision 
that the motion would be treated as a mo-
tion for summary judgment. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Trial e=l65 
When motion to dismiss is made and 
matters outside pleading are presented to 
and not excluded by court, record must 
clearly and affirmatively demonstrate that 
all parties, including nonmovant, are given 
reasonable opportunity to present addition-
al pertinent material if they wish. Rules of 
Civil Procedure, rules 12(b), (b)(6), 56. 
2. Judgment e=>183, 184 
Dismissal on merits after treating de-
fendant's motion to dismiss as one for sum-
mary judgment was improper, where mo-
tion to dismiss was not specifically denomi-
nated a Rule 12(b) motion, nor did it ex-
pressly state that motion was based upon 
failure to state claim upon which reason 
could be granted under 12(b)(6), and no 
notice was given to plaintiff in advance of 
memorandum decision that motion would 
be treated as motion for summary judg-
ment. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 12(b), 
(b)(6), 56. 
Appeal was taken from order of dis- Ralph J. Hafen, Salt Lake City, for plain-
missal entered by the Third District Court, tiff and appellant. 
2
- Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Co v. Harsh 4. Richardson v Grand Central Corp, Utah, 572 
Utah Corp., 5 Utah 2d 244, 300 P 2d 610 (1956). P.2d 395 (1977). 
3
- 7 Wash.App 56. 499 P 2d 57 (1972). 
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CONTINENTAL BANK AND T 
Cite as 20' 
t Utah 2d 98 
Tfce CONTINENTAL BANK AND TRUST 
COMPANY, a Utah. Banking Corpora-
tion, Plaintiff, 
v. 
David H. BYBEE and Verda M. Bybee, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
W, H. Adams Carpet Company, Third-
Party Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 8500. 
Supreme Court oi Utah. 
Feb. 8, 1057. 
Action on a note wherein defendant 
filed a third party complaint. From a judg-
ment of the Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake 
County, Joseph G. Jeppson, J., dismissing 
the third-party complaint, the defendants 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Mc-
Donough, C J., held, inter alia, that where 
buyer of carpet executed note which was 
negotiated by seller without recourse to 
bank and thereafter upon buyer's complaint 
of breach of warranty buyer and seller 
signed agreement prepared by buyer who 
was an attorney which included a pro-
vision that seller would "cancel any and 
all evidences of any indebtedness" by 
buyer to seller "their assignees, or trans-
ferees, or agents" and on back of settle-
ment check appeared the words "in full 
settlement on adjustment on carpet in-
stalled", parties intended only an adjust-
ment of purchase price by amount of such 
settlement check and not that seller would 
assume buyer's obligation on note. 
Affirmed. 
I. Contracts <§=!47(l) 
Evidence <©=46l(l) 
The intent of parties to contract 
should be ascertained first from the four 
corners of instrument itself, second from 
other contemporaneous writings concern-
ing the same subject matter, and third from 
extrinsic parol evidence of the intentions.1 
1. Mathia r. Madeen, 1 Utah 2d 46, 2G1 
P.2d 952. 
2. Perm Star Mining Co. v. Lyman, 84 
Utah 343, 231 P. 107; Jensen v. Kid-
man, 85 Utah 27, 38 P.2d 303. 
:UST COMPAJNT v. BYBEE Utah 773 
P.2d 773 
2. Evidence <§=448 
If ambiguity in contract can be recon-
ciled from a reasonable interpretation of 
the instrument, extrinsic evidence should 
not be allowed.2 
3. Contracts <£=I64 
If instrument on its face remains am-
biguous in spite of reasonable construc-
tion, intent of parties may be ascertained 
in light of all written instruments which 
were a part of same transaction.3 
4. Contracts <£=147(I) 
Evidence 3=461(1) 
If intent of parties to contract remains 
ambiguous even after examination of writ-
ten instruments which were part of the 
same transaction, then parol evidence may 
be admitted, and rules of construction may 
be invoked to declare intention of parties.4 
5. Compromise and Settlement <S=3»2 
Where buyer of carpet executed note 
which was negotiated by seller without re-
course to bank and thereafter upon buyer's 
complaint of breach of warranty buyer and 
seller signed agreement prepared by buyer, 
who was an attorney, which included a 
provision that seller would "cancel any and 
all evidences of any indebtedness" by buyer 
to seller, "their assignees, or transferees, 
or agents", and on back of settlement 
check appeared the words "in full settle-
ment on adjustment on carpet installed", 
parties intended only an adjustment of pur-
chase price by amount of such settlement 
check and not that seller would assume 
buyer's obligation on note. 
6. Contracts §=>I55 
Where party to contract was both the 
attorney draftsman of and party to the 
instrument, proper construction of such 
instrument should be strictly against him. 
David H. Bybee, L. M. Haynie, Salt 
Lake City, for appellants. 
3. Strike v. White, 91 Utah 170, 63 P.2d 
600. 
4. Milford State Bank v. West Field Canal 
& Irr. Co., 108 Utah 52S, 162 P.2d 101. 
G~i 
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Peter W. Billings and Albert J. Colton, 
Salt Lake City, for respondents. 
MCDONOUGH, Chief justice. 
Defendant appeals from the dismissal of 
a third-party complaint by which he im-
pleaded respondent, Adams Carpet Com-
pany, to an action on a note held by plain-
tiff (not a party to this appeal). Defend-
ant admits liability on the note to the plain-
tiff holder in due course, but asserts that 
the third-party defendant was obligated to 
"save appellants harmless" on the note. 
In February, 1955, appellant David H. 
Bybee entered into an agreement with re-
spondent Adams Carpet Company (the 
third-party defendants below) whereby 
carpet of a specified type was to be in-
stalled in the appellant's home for a pur-
chase price of $607. The carpet was in-
stalled and accepted, the appellants paying 
$50 cash upon installation and $127 shortly 
thereafter. The Bybees then signed a 
promissory note for the balance of $430, 
which note was promptly discounted and 
negotiated without recourse to the Conti-
nental Bank and Trust Company. Appel-
lants knew of the negotiation, and made 
one payment to the bank of $74.86, the first 
of six monthly payments promised on the 
note. 
Thereafter, Bybee complained of an un-
sightly, long seam near one end of the 
carpet which had widened to over an inch 
in places. The manager of Adams Carpet 
Company made several visits to appellants' 
home in attempting to adjust the matter, 
and on one occasion took with him a crew 
of men who worked over the seam and 
reburled i t Later, the manager offered to 
remove the carpet and refund the appel-
lants' money, which offer was refused. 
In response to David H. Bybee's letter 
of May 13, 1955, which threatened court 
action should no adjustment be effected 
within five days, the carpet company's 
agent and manager, Thompson, telephoned 
B>bee and negotiated an adjustment settle-
ment of $100 to be paid to Bybee by Adams 
Carpet Company. The same day Thomp-
son and Bybee signed an agreement, and 
Bybee received both the check for $100 and 
a bill of sale for the carpet marked, "paid 
in full." Above Bybee's indorsement on 
the check Thompson had written, "In full 
settlement on adjustment on carpet installed 
in the Bybee residence." 
The agreement had been drawn up by 
the appellant, David H. Bybee, who is an 
attorney at law, purportedly to include the 
oral terms settled over the telephone by 
the parties. It read as follows: 
"Agreement 
"This Agreement made and entered 
into by and between W. H. Adams & 
Sons of Salt Lake County, Utah and 
David H. Bybee of Davis County, 
Utah. 
"Witnesseth: 
"That Whereas, David H. Bybee has 
heretofore purchased a carpet from 
W. H. Adams & Sons which carpet 
has heretofore been installed and 
placed in the living room of the home 
of Mr. and Mrs. David H. Bybee at 
6885 Orchard Drive, Bountiful, Utah, 
and a contract for payment of the un-
paid purchase price had been entered 
into; 
"And, Whereas, he is dissatisfied 
with said carpet, 
"And, Whereas, W. H. Adams & 
Sons are desirous of making an ami-
cable settlement: It Is Mutually 
Agreed : 
" 1 . That W. H. Adams & Sons 
will pay to David H. Bybee the sum 
of One Hundred ($100.00) Dollars. 
"2. Will give David H. Bybee a Bill 
of Sale for the carpet showing com-
plete payment and vesting the title of 
the property in David H. Bybee. 
"3. Will cancel any and all evi-
dences of any indebtedness by David 
H. Bybee to the W. H. Adams & Sons, 
their assignees, or transferees, or 
agents. 
6-S 
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"4. David H. Bybee will give and 
does by these presents give to W. H. 
Adams & Sons a complete release from 
any and all liability, damages, actions 
or any claim that he may have against 
W. H. Adams & Sons by reason of 
having'purchased the aforesaid carpet. 
"Dated May 18, 1955. 
"W. H. Adams & Sons 
"By: / s / C. M. Thompson 
" / s / David S. Bybee 
"David H. Bybee" ' 
Appellants' only contention is that the 
trial court erred in applying an individual 
or subjective standard of meaning to a 
bilateral contract in writing. This prop-
osition is tersely supported by quotations 
from Wigmore on Evidence, American 
Jurisprudence and two Utah cases, all of 
which assume the very question which 
should be decided: That the contract in 
writing was unambiguous on its face. 
Respondent argues both that the agree-
ment was not unambiguous, on its face, and 
that the interpretation by the trial court 
in light of all the evidence was reason-
able in finding the contract did not include 
a promise to assume payment of the prom-
issory note in the hands of the bank. Re-
spondent claims that paragraphs 3 and 4 
were merely mutual releases between the 
parties themselves. 
[1-4] The sole question before this 
court, then, is whether the parties intended 
by this agreement that respondent should 
assume the obligation on the note held by 
Continental Bank. This intent should be 
ascertained first from the four corners of 
the instrument itself, second from other 
contemporaneous writings concerning the 
same subject matter, and third from the 
extrinsic parol evidence of the intentions. 
Mathis v. Madsen, 1 Utah 2d 46, 261 P.2d 
952. If the ambiguity can be reconciled 
from a reasonable interpretation of the in-
strument, extrinsic evidence should not be 
allowed. Penn Star Mining Co. v. Lyman, 
64 Utah 343, 231 P. 107; Jensen v. Kid-
LUST COMPANY v. BYBEE Utah 7 7 5 
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man, 85 Utah 27, 28 P.2d 303. If the in-
strument on its face remains ambiguous in 
spite of the reasonable construction, the 
intent may be ascertained in the light of 
all written^instruments which were a part 
of the same transaction. Strike v. White, 
91 Utah 170, 63 P.2d 600. If the intent is 
ambiguous- still, then parol evidence may be 
admitted, Mil ford State Bank v. West Field 
Canal & Irr. Co., 108 Utah 528, 162 P2d 
101; and rules of construction may be in-
voked to declare the intention of the parties. 
Penn Star Mining Co. v. Lyman, supra. 
[5] On the face of the agreement set 
out above, the words in paragraph 3 raise 
some doubt as to whether a negotiated note 
should be canceled as an evidence of in-
debtedness "by David H. Bybee to the W. 
H. Adams & Sons, their assignees, or trans-
ferees, or agents." But this ambiguity is 
reconciled when the contemporary writing 
on the back of the $100 settlement check 
is construed together with the agreement. 
The words, "In full settlement on adjust-
ment on carpet installed in the Bybee resi-
dence," which were written above David 
Bybee's negotiation of the ?10O check from 
respondent to Bybee clearly indicate that 
the parties intended only an adjustment 
of the purchase price by a $100 reduction, 
and not that respondent would assume 
Bybee's obligation on the promissory note 
in the hands of the bank. 
It is not credible that respondent in-
tended that Bybee should be given both 
$100 and the carpet free from further ob-
ligation, merely to assuage him from a 
claimed breach of warranty, the damages 
of which would be only a fraction of the 
purchase price. 
[6] Extrinsic parol evidence and rules 
of construction bear out this interpretation. 
Since Bybee was both the attorney drafts-
man of and a party to the instrument, the 
proper construction of this instrument 
should be strictly against him. When the 
instrument neither mentioned the promis-
sory note in paragraph 3, nor asked for 
G ^ 
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return of the note, which after all is proper 
means of legally cancelling a negotiable 
instrument, we feel the parties did not in-
tend such note to be assumed by respondent 
Adams Carpet Company. 
The ambiguity within the four corners of 
the instrument in question can be clarified 
by the contemporary writing, rules of con-
struction, and the parol extrinsic evidence 
within the record. 
Judgment is affirmed- Costs to respond-
ents. 
CROCKETT, WADE, WORTHEN and 
HENRIOD, JJ., concur. 
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Cite as 7M P.2d 
Elmer Lee PHILLIPS and Nilda 
Phillips, Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
v. 
Dr. J.A. SMITH, Jr., University Medical 
Center, and Jane Does Nos. 1-5, 
Defendants. 
Ungricht, Handle & Deamer, Real Party 
in Interest and Appellee. 
No. 20873. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 23, 1989. 
Attorney sued client to recover fees 
pursuant to a contingent fee agreement. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
John A. Rokich, J., entered order enforcing 
attorney's lien. Client appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that at-
torney's lien was invalid, since recovery 
had been obtained by another attorney, and 
contingent fee agreement did not cover 
possibility of change of counsel. 
Reversed. 
Stewart, J., dissented and filed opinion 
in which Howe, Associate C.J., concurred. 
1. Attorney and Client <3=183 
Attorney's lien does not attach until 
after the commencement of a lawsuit. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-51-41. 
2. Attorney and Client <s=>174 
Attorney's lien did not attach, where 
client discharged attorney and obtained set-
tlement of lawsuit through use of another 
firm, and contingency fee arrangement 
with first firm did not cover this eventuali-
ty. U.C.A.1953, 78-51-41; Rules of Prof. 
Conduct, Rule 1.5(c). 
Brian C. Harrison, Provo, for plaintiffs 
and appellants. 
Steven Randle, Salt Lake City, for real 
party in interest and appellee. 
v. SMITH Utah 449 
449 (Utah 1989) 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Nilda Phillips appeals from an order en-
forcing an attorney's lien. Nilda and her 
now-deceased husband, Elmer Lee Phillips, 
brought a medical malpractice action, ini-
tially retaining the law firm of Ungricht, 
Randle & Deamer ("the Ungricht firm"). 
Before any resolution was achieved, the 
Phillipses terminated their relationship 
with the Ungricht firm and hired new coun-
sel. The new counsel negotiated a settle-
ment. The Ungricht firm sought to en-
force an attorney's lien on the settlement 
amount, claiming it was entitled to a con-
tingency fee of one-third of the settlement 
figure. The trial court ruled in favor of 
the Ungricht firm. We reverse because we 
find the attorney's lien to be invalid. 
In November of 1983, the Phillipses re-
tained the Ungricht firm to represent them 
in a medical malpractice claim against Dr. 
J.A. Smith, Jr., the University of Utah 
Medical Center, and others. The claim 
arose out of an operation performed by Dr. 
Smith on Mr. Phillips. The Phillipses and 
the Ungricht firm entered into a preprinted 
written contract that provided for the pay-
ment to the firm of a contingent fee of 
one-third of the "amount recovered." 
The Ungricht firm gave defendants ad-
vance notice of the Phillipses' intent to sue, 
as required by section 78-14-8 of the Code, 
and then opened settlement negotiations. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 (1987). The 
hospital and other defendants offered $35,-
000 to settle the case. The Ungricht firm 
sent the Phillipses a letter dated June 15, 
1984, advising them to accept the offer and 
expressing doubt that either further nego-
tiations or a trial would result in a larger 
recovery. The letter, written by Michael L. 
Deamer, stated in pertinent part: 
In my opinion and in the opinion of Jerry 
Ungricht of this office, we very strongly 
recommend that you consider and take 
the settlement offer. This is based upon 
our careful evaluation of the case and 
subsequent evaluations in light of con-
versations with you and subsequent eval-
uations in light of our investigation of 
recoveries for similar personal injuries. 
I can appreciate that you feel you have 
CrP 
450 Utah 768 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
been badly wronged and you ought to 
receive $100,000 or even a Million Dol-
lars. In my opinion you will never re-
ceive those amounts. 
The letter also described four alternative 
courses of action then available to the Phil-
lipses. Options one and three are at issue 
here. 
1. Terminate this law firm's representa-
tion of the matter and turn the matter 
over to another law firm. 
2. Hire another attorney at your ex-
pense to make a "second opinion" analy-
sis of the facts and evidence. 
3. Authorize me to make a counter of-
fer for $25,000 in cash plus a pass 
through of the medical bills with further 
authorization to accept some amount in 
that range including a figure half way 
between, subject to your final approval. 
4. Accept the offer as currently stated. 
The Phillipses rejected the offer and in-
structed the Ungricht firm to continue set-
tlement negotiations and to make a $45,000 
counter offer. Through further negotia-
tions, the firm obtained a settlement offer 
of approximately $40,000. The firm com-
municated the offer to the Phillipses, who 
rejected it and terminated the employment 
of the Ungricht firm. The Phillipses then 
retained another firm to pursue their claim. 
After being discharged, and before any 
suit was filed or settlement consummated, 
the Ungricht firm filed a "Notice of Attor-
ney's Lien" against the Phillipses for $13,-
161.44, one-third of the $40,000 settlement 
offer negotiated by the firm. The Phillips-
es, through their new counsel, then formal-
ly filed suit against the hospital and other 
defendants. Eventually, new counsel nego-
tiated and the Phillipses accepted a settle-
ment of approximately $40,000, on terms 
essentially identical to those defendants 
X. Efmer Lee Philips died shortly arter settle-
ment of the malpractice claim. 
2. Although we do not reach the issue because it 
was not raised on appeal, we observe that the 
statutory attorney's lien would appear to be 
unavailable to the Ungricht firm, even if the fee 
agreement had covered the contingency that 
arose in this case. The statute requires that 
there be a "commencement of an action" before 
had offered before the Ungricht firm was 
discharged and new counsel retained. 
The hospital, having been notified of the 
Ungricht firm's lien on the settlement 
amount, moved for a determination of the 
Ungricht firm's entitlement to the claimed 
attorney fee. The Ungricht firm moved for 
an order enforcing its attorney's lien. The 
trial court issued an order enforcing the 
lien for $13,314.78. That order is the sub-
ject of this appeal. The parties have placed 
$15,000 in an interest-bearing account to 
await a final determination of this issue. 
[1] Before this Court, Mrs. Phillips1 
challenges the trial court's order on various 
procedural grounds that we do not reach 
because we find the underlying attorney's 
lien to be invalid. The lien asserted by the 
Ungricht firm is a statutory creature gov-
erned by section 78-51-41 of the Code. 
That section provides in pertinent part: 
The compensation of an attorney and 
counselor for his services is governed by 
agreement, express or implied, which is 
not restrained by law. From the com-
mencement of an action,2 or the service 
of an answer containing a counterclaim, 
the attorney who appears for a party has 
a lien upon his client's cause of action or 
counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, 
report, decision or judgment in his 
client's favor and to the proceeds thereof 
in whosesoever hands they may come, 
and cannot be affected by any settlement 
between the parties before or after judg-
ment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-41 (1987). 
[2] Under the statute, an attorney's lien 
can arise only out of the "agreement, ex-
press or implied" between the lawyer and 
the client. Therefore, the statutory lien is 
only as good as the underlying agreement 
regarding compensation. Cf. Bishop v. 
any (ien arises. Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-41 
(1987). An action is "commenced" in Utah 
when a complaint is filed. Utah R.Civ.P. 3. 
While it represented the Phillipses, the Ungricht 
firm did not file a complaint. It went no fur-
ther than filing a notice of intent to sue pursu-
ant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8. That does 
not appear to satisfy the technical requirements 
of the lien statute. 
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Parker, 103 Utah 145, 151, 134 P.2d 180, tract against one who is "both the attorney 
183 (1943) (applying the predecessor to sec- draftsman of and a party to the instru-
tion 78-51-41). Here, the agreement was ment." Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. 
set forth in a written contract between the Bybee, 6 Utah 2d 98, 102, 306 P.2d 773, 775 
Ungricht firm and the Phillipses that states (1957). We also note that in the present 
in relevant part: "I agree to pay my attor- circumstances, this principle is reinforced 
neys for the above legal services as fol- by the fact that the instrument at issue 
lows: Retainer $500 for costs. One-third relates to an attorney/client contingent fee 
(V3) of amount recovered and value less arrangement. The present Rules of Pro-
costs advanced."3 In order for the statu- fessional Conduct of the Utah State Bar 
tory lien to attach as the Ungricht firm require that all contingent fee agreements 
argues, this agreement must be read as be in writing.4 That requirement, which 
providing for payment to the firm of a fee does not apply to other types of fee ar-
of one-third of the amount of any recovery rangements, reflects in part a concern that 
obtained by the Phillipses on their malprac- contingent fee arrangements are particu-
tice claim, even a recovery resulting from larly likely to be misunderstood by clients, 
the efforts of a successor attorney after That concern is enhanced where the clients 
the termination of the relationship between are unsophisticated with respect to legal 
the Ungricht firm and the Phillipses and matters as in the present case. The rule is 
without regard to any fee arrangement the meant to ensure that clients will be fully 
Phillipses may have made with successor informed as to the terms and consequences 
counsel. We conclude that the contract of the contingent fee agreement, 
cannoc be so read. j n e written contract in the present case 
In interpreting the contract, we must be is silent concerning the liability of the Phil-
mindful of the general principle that a lipses for the contingent fee should either 
court will strictly construe terms in a con- they or the law firm terminate the relation-
3. The contract is a standard form agreement 
prepared by the Ungricht firm. The specific 
matters of representation and fee arrangement 
are handwritten in spaces provided on the form. 
These handwritten portions are indicated here 
with italics. The complete written contract 
states: 
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
I, [sic] hereby retain and employ the law 
firm of UNGRICHT, RANDLE & DEAMER 
. . . as my attorneys in the following matters: 
Medical Malpractice Action for Elmer Lee Phil-
lips. 
I agree to pay my attorneys for the above 
legal services as follows: Retainer $500 for 
costs. One-third (lA) of amount recovered and 
value less costs advanced. 
I agree that the above retainer shall be the 
minimum fee charged and unless otherwise 
agreed in advance, the terms of this agree-
ment shall extend to other matters for which 
the client requests services after the date of 
this agreement. 
I agree additionally to pay court costs, filing 
and service fees, subpoena costs, photos, court 
reporter costs, traveling and lodging expenses 
of my attorneys outside of Salt Lake City, 
Utah, long distance telephone calls and word 
processing costs, when billed to me periodi-
cally. 
I acknowledge that the above attorneys 
have not made any guarantee regarding the 
successful termination of said legal matters, 
and I request that my attorneys not settle nor 
compromise this matter without my express 
approval. 
In the event I fail to pay the fees and costs 
when billed, for whatever reason, I hereby 
grant my attorneys a lien on said legal mat-
ters and agree to pay interest on all amounts 
overdue thirty days or more at an annual 
percentage rate of 18% (ll/:% per month) 
until paid, plus all court costs and reasonable 
attorney's fees to enforce collection. 
4. Rule 1.5(c) provides: 
A fee may be contingent on the outcome of 
the matter for which the service is rendered, 
except in a matter in which a contingent fee is 
prohibited A contingent fee agreement 
shall be in writing and shall state the method 
by which the fee is to be determined, includ-
ing the percentage or percentages that shall 
accrue to the lawyer in the event of settle-
ment, trial or appeal, litigation and other ex-
penses to be deducted from the recovery, and 
whether such expenses are to be deducted 
before or after the contingent fee is calculat-
ed. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee mat-
ter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a 
written statement stating the outcome of the 
matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the 
remittance to the client and the method of its 
determination. 
Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(c). 
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ship before any recovery is obtained. It 
simply provides for a flat fee of one-third 
of the recovery. We conclude that as a 
matter of law, the agreement must be in-
terpreted as being predicated on the as-
sumption that the Ungricht firm would 
handle the matter through its conclusion by 
settlement or trial and that its drafter com-
pletely failed to provide for the possibility 
that the firm or the clients might choose to 
terminate the relationship before the claim 
was resolved. Since the agreement here 
did not provide for the contingency that 
arose, the lien founded upon the agreement 
is invalid. 
Our conclusion regarding the agree-
ment's meaning is supported by the letter 
sent by the Ungricht firm to the Phillipses 
on June 15th. The letter outlined four 
alternative courses of action that the Phil-
lipses could consider in evaluating defend-
ants' settlement offer of $35,000. One of 
these alternatives was to "[tjerminate this 
law firm's representation of the matter and 
turn the matter over to another law firm." 
The letter did not suggest that if the Phil-
Vipses followed this course, they would stffi 
have to pay the Ungricht firm a full one-
third of any money the Phillipses might 
obcain at some future date through the 
efforts of their new lawyers as well as 
paying a fee to the new lawyers. Yet the 
knowledge of such a liability would have 
been of great importance to the Phillipses 
in weighing the relative advantages of the 
various options set out in the letter. The 
silence of the letter regarding any liability 
for the contingent fee supports our conclu-
sion that the parties' fee agreement did not 
provide for the possibility of the Phillipses' 
dismissing the Ungricht firm and seeking 
other counsel before settlement. 
Finally, the interpretation argued by the 
Ungricht firm could lead to an unconsciona-
ble result. For example, if the Phillipses' 
new counsel had settled the claim for dou-
ble or quadruple the amount negotiated by 
the Ungricht firm, the Ungricht firm would 
be entitled to a full one-third of that larger 
5. The Ungricht firm may be entitled to compen-
sation under a quantum meruit theory, but we 
do not reach that question because the present 
action only involves enforcement of a statutory 
sum even though it had not contributed to 
obtaining the larger sum. Such a result 
certainly cannot be presumed to have been 
within the contemplation of the parties to 
the fee agreement in, the sJ^ewie, of v<arf 
clear language to that effect in the agree-
ment. 
We are cognizant that the facts of this 
case may make it appear inequitable to 
invalidate the attorney's lien and leave the 
Ungricht firm without that guarantee of 
compensation for the services performed. 
However, equitable principles are not at 
issue here.3 An attorney's "charging" lien 
under section 78-51-41, as opposed to a 
common law "retaining" lien, see Midvale 
Motors, Inc. v. Saunders, 21 Utah 2d 181, 
183-84, 442 P.2d 938, 940 (1968), is purely a 
creature of statute. The lien's validity is 
dependent upon the terms of the agree-
ment between the lawyer and the client 
Here, the express agreement of the parties-
did not provide for the possibility that Un-
gricht's representation of the Phillipses 
would be terminated before the Phillipses' 
claim was settled. Therefore, the Phillips-
es owed the Ungricht firm nothing under 
the written contract when they terminated 
that representation. 
The trial court's order enforcing the at-
torney's lien is reversed. 
HALL, C.J., and DURHAM, J., 
concur. 
STEWART, Justice: (dissenting). 
I respectfully dissent. 
The plaintiffs hired the law firm of Un-
gricht, Randle & Deamer ("Ungricht") to 
pursue a medical malpractice claim against 
the defendants. The plaintiffs were to pay 
Ungricht a one-third contingent fee. Un-
gricht filed the required notice of intent to 
commence an action, performed much of 
the legal research, prepared a complaint 
(although it was never filed), engaged in 
multiple settlement offers and negotia-
tions, and obtained a settlement offer of 
lien. For this reason the issues addressed by 
Justice Stewart have no bearing on the disposi-
tion of this appeal. 
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$39 984 31 The Phillipses were dissat-
isfied with the offer, discharged Ungncht, 
and hired Brian C Harrison, who presently 
represents the Phillipses He was to be 
paid a one-quarter contingent fee Eight 
months later, Harrison obtained an identi-
cal settlement offer, and the case was set-
tled 
The majority focuses on whether Un-
gncht has a lien under Utah Code Ann 
§ 78-31-41 (1987) The majority properly 
states that the statutory attorney's hen, 
§ 78-51-41, "is only as good as the under-
lying agreement regarding compensation " 
While that is true, the real question m this 
case is, how much compensation is owed 
Harrison and how much is owed the Un-
gncht firm7 Because of the special nature 
of attorney fees contracts and the power of 
the courts over fee agreements, the ques-
tion of what is owed the two groups of 
attorneys ought to be decided m one pro-
ceeding Indeed, requiring them to be de-
cided m two separate proceedings as the 
majonty does, is not only inefficient and 
costh but also will hkeh lead to mischief 
and inequitable results The attorneys and 
the trial court recognized as much in the 
proceedings below—indeed, the parties 
stipulated to the court's settlement of the 
entire fee controversy m this case 
The majonty's ruling will be unnecessar-
ily burdensome to the Phillipses, the Un-
gncht law firm, and possibly to Harnson 
In effect, the majonty holds that Hamson 
is entitled to the full contingent fee al-
though he reached a settlement identical to 
the proffered settlement obtained by Un-
1. Damages are recoverable for breach of con-
tract where the attorney under a contingent fee 
arrangement has been discharged without 
cause 
It has been held that where an attorney is 
employed on a contingent contract to perform 
legal services, his discharge without fault on 
his part before he has performed his work, 
constitutes a breach of the contract and ren-
ders the client liable to respond in damages 
The measure of damages in that situation is 
the agreed percentage of the amount the 
client is subsequentl> able to secure by settle 
ment or judgment less a fair allowance for 
services and expenses not expended by the 
discharged attorney in performing the bal 
ance of the contract In some instances the 
right to recover the full fee has been upheld 
v. SMITH Utah 453 
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gncht The majonty suggests that the Un-
gncht firm may, however recover some-
thing m a second, independent suit based 
on quantum meruit, but that may subject 
the Phillipses to a fee that may or may not 
be equitable from their point of view, hav-
ing already paid Hamson a full fee l 
The awarding and approving of attorney 
fees is subject to the inherent power of a 
court to regulate the professional conduct 
of attorneys Seal v Pipeline, Inc, 731 
F2d 1194, 1196 (5th Cir 1984) (citing 
Schlesinger v Teitelbaum, 475 F 2d 137 
(3d Cir), cert denied, 414 US 1111, 94 
S Ct 840, 38 L Ed 2d 738 (1973)) The ex-
istence of an attorney-client relationship is 
governed not only by contract law, see 
Anderson v Galley, 100 Idaho 796, 801, 
606 P 2d 90, 95 (1980), but also by numer-
ous ethical principles See Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, Rule 1 5 (adopted by Utah 
Supreme Court, effective January 1, 1988) 
It has been held unjust for attorney fees 
to exceed the amount provided by a single 
contingent fee agreement when successive 
law firms are involved as here See Reu-
benbaum v B & H Express, Inc, 6 A D 
2d 47, 174 NYS2d 287, 290-91 (1958) 
But see Adams v Fisher, 390 So 2d 1248, 
1251 (Fla Dist Ct App 1980) That result, 
however, may depend on the understanding 
of the attorneys and the client 
The time and place to resolve the issue is 
clearly in the trial court on remand All 
interested parties will be before the court. 
The only issue to settle will be the claims 
of counsel to the funds set aside as attor-
Other cases although allowing the attorney to 
recover as for breach of contract, do not al-
low the full fee as the measure of damages 
where the employment contract had not been 
substantially performed 
Some cases hold that an attorney dis-
charged under a contingent fee contract with-
out fault on his part may at his election recov-
er the reasonable value of the services ren-
dered up to the time of discharge In other 
jurisdictions the discharged attorney has no 
election and may not recover on the contract, 
but is restricted to a quantum meruit recov-
ery 
7 AmJur2d Attorneys at Law § 298 at 321-22 
(1980) (footnotes omitted) Whether there was 
a discharge here has not been determined 
CH5 
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ney fees. In dealing with a problem sim-
ilar to the one at hand, the court in Seal 
stated: 
The dispute before the court is not one 
between a client and an attorney over the 
validity of an employment contract or the 
setting of a fair fee. The fee has been 
found fully earned and appropriate, al-
beit on the high side of this court's pref-
erence. The sole issue is apportionment 
of the earned fee between the lawyers 
who earned it. 
The magistrate chose to apportion the 
fee as between Bart and Robin, allowing 
Bart 13% and awarding the balance to 
Robin. Breland, the first attorney em-
ployed, was compensated exclusively on 
a quantum meruit basis. We find that 
disparate treatment inappropriate under 
the circumstances of this case. 
The scenario of seriatim attorneys is 
regrettable, but as the magistrate found, 
Breland and Bart were discharged with-
out cause. Each was retained by Seal to 
assist in the recovery of damages for his 
injuries. Each undertook the same pro-
fessional obligations. Each had the 
same 40% contingent fee agreement. 
Each contributed to the ultimate result. 
Each is entitled to the same evaluation of 
his contributions and professional ef-
forts, measured by the guidelines estab-
lished by DR 2-106(B) of the Code of 
Professional Responsibility 
731 F.2d at 1195-96. 
A just result can only be obtained by 
apportioning fees among the successive 
counsel. See, e.g., Seal 731 F.2d at 1196; 
LaBach v. Hampton, 585 S.W.2d 434 (Ky. 
Ct.App.1979). And that should be done in 
one proceeding before disbursement of pro-
ceeds from which the fees should be paid. 
Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. By bee, 6 
Utah 2d 98, 306 P.2d 773 (1957), and Mid-
vale Motors, Inc. v. Saunders, 21 Utah 2d 
181, 442 P.2d 938 (1968), which are relied 
on by the majority, are not applicable to 
this case. 
A determination of the total fees payable 
and an apportionment of them between the 
attorneys, if appropriate, in the trial court 
is exactly what all the parties wanted. 
Their express stipulation authorized the tri-
al court to resolve the issue of attorney 
fees: 
The Court: Is it stipulated that I can 
hear this matter with regards to the lien, 
attorney's lien for fees in this matter? 
Mr. Harrison: Yes. 
The Court So, there will be no need for 
any type of further action and based 
upon what is presented to me today I 
can make a decision as to whether or 
not they re entitled to fees. 
Mr. Harrison: I think if the Court looks 
at the law—I brought a case that should 
be dispositive on the issue, your Honor, 
and I believe once the court reviews that 
case that the course will be clear. 
So, I guess with that provision I suggest 
that I think the court should hear that 
issue of the attorney's lien that was filed 
by predecessor counsel, and I think that 
is appropriate prior to defendant's and 
our settlement being entered as a court 
order. 
The Court: Is that agreeable with all 
parties, then? 
Mr. Randle: That's agreed, your Honor. 
The Court: Is that agreeable, Mr. Harri-
son? 
Mr. Harrison: Yes. 
The Court: So, we all understand that I 
will determine, first of all, whether they 
have a right to a lien. If they have a 
right to a lien, there may be the necessi-
ty of an evidentiary hearing to determine 
the amount of fees you're entitled to. 
Is that stipulated to by all parties, that 
that is the issue before me? 
Mr. Harrison: Yes. 
Mr. Randle: Yes. 
(Emphasis added.) 
This case should be reversed and re-
manded for an apportionment of fees be-
tween the Ungricht firm and Harrison. 
HOWE, Associate C.J., concurs in 



























MR. WILSON: Sure. 
Q During the entire time of that four months, 
did you ever -- before the case was settled, did you 
ever speak to Don Hughes? 
A No. 
Q Did Don Hughes ever explain to you what he 
was going to do in your case? 
A No. 
Q Because you never talked to him? 
A I never did. 
Q Did he explain what his fee would be? 
A No. 




Ron did. Yes. 
Okay. Did you feel you were solicited by 
Mr. Bennett? 
MR. HUGHES: I'll object, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: What's the basis. 
MR. HUGHES: Its relevance. 
THE COURT: I'll grant the objection. 
MR. WILSON: Your Honor, I believe there is a 
body of law that says solicitation in itself may be 
malpractice. 
MR. HUGHES: But you've got to — 
50 
tf-l 
1 THE COURT: But that's Mr. Bennett. Mr. 
2 Bennett is not on trial here. I've granted the 
3 objection. Move on to your next question, please. 
4 Q (By MR. WILSON) All right. Whoever you 
5 hired as your attorney, did you expect them to do a 
6 good job? 
7 A Yes. I did. 
8 Q Did you expect them to make sure that you 
9 got whatever benefits you were entitled to? 
10 A Yes. I did. 
11 Q Yourself, did you even know the difference 
12 between personal injury protection benefits and 
13 liability coverage? 
14 A No. 
15 Q Did Mr. Hughes ever explain that to you? 
16 A No. 
17 Q Did Mr. Bennett ever explain that to you? 
18 A No. 
19 Q Did Mr. Hughes ever write you any letters of 
20 any kind, did you ever get any correspondence up until 
21 the time the case settled? 
22 A No. 
23 Q Did you eventually talk to him once over the 
24 phone? 
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PIP benefits from Archuleta's own. . ." 
3. Page 6, line 2, " [R. at 961-965]" should be corrected to 
read "[R. at 692 1J3] ." 
4. Page 6, line 5 of Paragraph 3, "[R. at 1176-78]" should 
read "[R. at 1176, R. at 694 1114-19]." 
5. Page 6, line 2 of Paragraph 4, "[R. at 969]" should read 
"[R. at 695 and 969]." 
6. Page 6, line 3 of Paragraph 4, "[R. at 1178]" should read 
"[R. at 695] . " 
7. Page 7, line 3 of Paragraph 6, "[R. at 85-86]" should 
read "[R. at 695-697]." 
8. Page 7, lines 6 & 7 of Paragraph 7, "[R. at 53]" should 
read "[R. at 693 119-11; 694 H12 & 13; 697 1144; 698 1146-51]." 
9. Page 7, line 4 of Paragraph 8, "[R. at 1076]" should read 
"[R. at 693 119-11; R. at 694 1112 & 13, 1075 & 1076]." 
10. Page 7, line 6 of Paragraph 8, add "uncontroverted 
testimony." 
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11. Page 7, line 3 of Paragraph 9, add "and [R. at 694 1113]." 
12. Page 8f line 2 of Paragraph 10, add "and [R. at 693 
1111]." 
13. Page 8, line 2 of Paragraph 15, " [R. at 523-34, 690]" 
should read "[R. at 523-25, 690]." 
14. Page 18, line 5 of the first full Paragraph, add after 
the quote, "[R. at 970 lines 1-3]." 
DATED this ^ k t day of October, 1996. 
HANSON,_EPPERSON & SMITH 
rCHARD K. GLAUSER 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, this day of October, 1996, two (2) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Errata to Appellant's Brief to the 
following: 
Don Hughes 
Attorney Pro Se 
P.O. Box 572112 
Houston, Texas 77257 
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